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ABSTRACT 
Since national, regional, or continental borders do not hinder transnational 
terrorist organizations, a Theater Special Operations Command is forced to conduct 
operations across a wide range of political and social environments.  Special Operations 
Command-South (SOCSOUTH), the theater special operations component of the United 
States Southern Command, has determined that each sub-region within its area of 
responsibility has particular nuances that require separate and distinct command 
elements.  Due to this determination, SOCSOUTH has decided to revise its approach to 
the command and control (C2) of all special operations forces operating throughout 
Central and South America.  SOCSOUTH calls this new C2 approach “Distributive C2.” 
The purpose of this thesis is to conduct a thorough analysis of the SOCSOUTH 
Distributive C2 concept and propose recommendations for improvement of its 
effectiveness and efficiency.  Using multiple theories of organizational design and 
recommendations based on personal observations and interviews, this thesis will propose 
a long term command and control structure for SOCSOUTH.  The authors hope to 
provide SOCSOUTH and other theater special operations commands with a C2 structure 
that will allow them to better coordinate and prosecute their war on terror mission across 
multiple sub-regions and ensure proper integration into a larger global counter-terrorism 
strategic plan. 
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The United States and our partners continue to pursue a significantly 
degraded but still dangerous al-Qaeda network.  Yet the enemy we face 
today in the War on Terror is not the same enemy we faced on September 
11.  Our effective counterterrorist efforts, in part, have forced the terrorists 
to evolve and modify their ways of doing business.  Our understanding of 
the enemy has evolved as well.  Today, the principal terrorist enemy 
confronting the United States is a transnational movement of extremist 
organizations, networks, and individuals — and their state and non-state 
supporters — which have in common that they exploit Islam and use 
terrorism for ideological ends.1 
National Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism, September 2006 
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President George Bush 
addressed a joint session of Congress and the American people and declared a war 
against international terrorism.  President Bush stated that “our war on terror begins with 
al Qaeda, but...will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, 
stopped and defeated.”2  The Department of Defense (DoD), specifically the United 
States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), was then charged with planning, 
resourcing, and executing the Global War on Terror (GWOT). 
The current USSOCOM approach for the GWOT is to synchronize “global 
operations against terrorist networks in coordination with other Combatant Commands, 
US Government agencies, and international partners through collaboration and the 
employment of national-level systems to maximize these combined effects.”3  To 
facilitate this approach, the DoD has vastly increased the size of the USSOCOM staff and 
integrated personnel from other U. S. Government (USG) departments and agencies.  
                                                 
1 The White House, The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 2006: 5. 
2 President George Bush, Address before a joint session of the U.S. Congress on September 20, 2001, 
“U.S. Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11,” 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/ 20010920-8.html (accessed August 24, 2007). 
3 The United States Special Operations Command, United States Special Operations Command 2007 
Posture Statement, MacDill Air Force Base, FL, 2007: 3. 
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Additionally, USSOCOM transformed its organizational structure by establishing the 
Center for Special Operations (CSO) and the Joint Interagency Coordination Group 
(JIACG).  The CSO now exercises command and control of GWOT operations from its 
location at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.4 
Despite the substantial growth of both the USSOCOM headquarters staff and 
special operations units5, the theater special operations commands (TSOCs) themselves 
have experienced virtually no manning increases.  This fact seems at odds with the 
approach favored by Michael Vickers, the current Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC).6  
Operations in the GWOT primarily occur at the country and sub-region 
level.  Strategy is most effectively made at these levels, as well as at the 
global level.  Our system of high command across departments and 
agencies is focused on the regional level, which is of reduced importance 
in both GWOT strategy and operations.  In short, our interagency 
command structure is not well aligned with the geographic realities of the 
GWOT.  GWOT operational areas should be established at the country 
and sub-region level.  Sub-regional task forces are needed to conduct 
integrated area surveillance and cross-border operations.  DoD senior 
counterterrorism presence is in need of significant elevation at the Country 
Team level, particularly in countries with which the US is not at war.  
Standing Interagency Task Forces commanded by either a military officer 
or CIA officer, as operational circumstances dictate, should be established 
as the execution arm for the designated operational areas.7   
Given Mr. Vickers’ rationale, the TSOC staffs, rather than USSOCOM’s, should 
be enjoying manpower growth.  Because they are regionally focused, these TSOCs have 
the potential for a greater working relationship with the U.S. Embassy country teams.  
These country teams are typically comprised of senior representatives from the State 
                                                 
4 General Bryan D. Brown, Commander, United States Special Operations Command, “US Special 
Operations Command: Meeting the Challenges of the 21st Century,” Joint Forces Quarterly 40 (2006): 39. 
5 General Bryan D. Brown, Commander, United States Special Operations Command, Statement 
before the House Armed Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and 
Capabilities on January 31, 2007, “Current Manning, Equipping, and Readiness Challenges Facing Special 
Operations Forces,” Congressional Record Daily Digest, 110th Congress, D135. 
6 The White House, “Personnel Announcement,” 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/04/20070404-4.html (accessed April 19, 2007). 
7 Michael Vickers, Testimony before the House Committee on Armed Services’ Subcommittee on 
Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities on March 15, 2006, “Implementing GWOT Strategy: 
Overcoming Interagency Problems,” Congressional Record, 109th Congress, 2d session, Vol. 152, no. 33.. 
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Department, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Defense Department’s Security 
Assistance Organization and Attaches.  These teams form a valuable mechanism for 
ensuring interagency collaboration and coordination at the operational level.  Typically 
however, Department of Defense representation to an embassy’s country team is limited 
to personnel grounded in the doctrine of general purpose forces who possess a limited 
understanding of special operations capabilities.  Excepting the Marine Security 
Detachments, there are two “basic components of DoD’s ‘overseas presence’ in U.S. 
embassies: security assistance offices or SAOs (overseen by the Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency, defense attaché offices (overseen by Defense Intelligence 
Agency).”8 
As former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Andrew Hoehn 
noted, “SAO personnel serve under the direction and supervision of the Chief of the U.S. 
Diplomatic Mission (COM).  The regional combatant commanders command the SAOs 
in all matters that are not functions of the COM.”9             
Depending on the particular embassy, the security assistance offices (SAOs) may 
operate under different names.  Nonetheless, “[a]n SAO is a DoD organization, 
regardless of actual title, located overseas with assigned responsibilities for carrying out 
the security assistance management functions.”10  These six primary responsibilities 
include: 
1. Foreign Military Sales Case Management 
2. Training Management 
3. Program Monitoring 
4. Evaluation of Partner Nation military capabilities and requirements 
                                                 
8 Andrew Hoehn, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategy), Testimony before the 
Committee on Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and 
International Relations on May 1, 2002, http://www.DOD.mil/DODgc/olc/docs/test02-05-01hoePN.rtf 
(accessed August 22, 2007). 
9 Andrew Hoehn, Testimony, May 1, 2002. 
10 U.S. Department of Defense, Directive 5132.12, Consolidations and Reductions of U.S. Defense 
Attaché Offices (DAOs) and Security Assistance Organizations (SAOs), by Donald Atwood, U.S. Deputy 
Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1991, 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/513212p.pdf (accessed August 22, 2007). 
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5. Rationalization, Standardization, Interoperability 
6. International Armaments Cooperative Program11 
The Defense Attaché Office (DAO) is typically the other standard component of 
an Embassy’s military workforce.  The DAO is part of “a multi-mission intelligence and 
diplomatic organization that operates in 134 locations, managing and supporting a variety 
of Department of Defense and USG missions.”12 
Specifically, the various DAOs are given the following core tasks in accordance 
with DoD Directive C-5105.32: 
1. Obtain and report political-military information 
2. Diplomatically represent the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 
the Military Services 
3. Serve as primary political-advisor to the Chief of Mission.13   
As illustrated above, both the DAO and SAO deal with more conventional 
military mission sets.  Naturally both are focused entirely on the country in which they 
are residing.  Regional issues are typically managed by the Geographic Combatant 
Commander.  
Through its execution of the regional war on terror plan, the Special Operations 
Command-South (SOCSOUTH), a component of the United States Southern Command 
(USSOUTHCOM) and USSOCOM, has acknowledged particular cultural, geographic, 
and/or political nuances within its area of responsibility (AOR).  For instance, certain 
countries may be exceedingly sensitive to U.S. military presence within their borders 
while some may welcome as large a DoD presence as the U.S. government is willing to 
commit.  Additionally, being culturally and politically attuned to regional intricacies 
enables the U.S. military to tailor operations for each specific country or sub-region. 
                                                 
11 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Security Assistance Organization (SAO) and 
Responsibilities,” PowerPoint Presentation, April 2007, 
http://www.disam.dsca.mil/Research/Presentations/4%20SAOResp.ppt (accessed August 22, 2007). 
12 Andrew Hoehn, Testimony, May 1, 2002. 
13 Andrew Hoehn, Testimony, May 1, 2002. 
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As a result, SOCSOUTH has divided its AOR into three major sub-regions.  
Consequently, SOCSOUTH has revised its approach to the command and control (C2) of 
all special operations forces (SOF) operating throughout Central and South America.  
The intent of this new C2 approach, called “Distributive C2,” is to facilitate rapid 
decision making, promote interagency coordination, and navigate the particular political 
environments within the SOUTHCOM AOR.14 
 
Figure 1.   SOUTHCOM Organization 
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to conduct a thorough analysis of the SOCSOUTH 
Distributive C2 concept and propose recommendations for improvement of its 
effectiveness and efficiency.  Using multiple theories of organizational design and 
recommendations based on personal observations and interviews, this thesis will propose 
a long term command and control structure for SOCSOUTH.  The authors hope to 
provide SOCSOUTH and other theater special operations commands with a C2 structure 
                                                 
14 Captain Paul Brister, “Information Paper on SOCSOUTH Distributive Command and Control,” 
Special Operations Command South, Homestead Air Reserve Base, FL, January 18, 2007. 
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that will allow them to better coordinate and prosecute its war on terror mission across 
multiple sub-regions and ensure proper integration into a larger global counter-terrorism 
strategic plan. 
This thesis will determine if the SOCSOUTH Distributive C2 concept does 
improve its ability to prosecute its Regional War on Terror (RWOT).  In this regard, this 
thesis will seek to answer the following questions: 
• Does this new C2 concept improve SOCSOUTH’s speed in conducting 
RWOT operations? 
• Does this new C2 concept improve SOCSOUTH’s flexibility to adapt as its 
terrorist opponent changes its methods and force structure? 
• Does this new C2 concept improve SOCSOUTH’s integration into the 
interagency and the plans of higher commands? 
• Does this new C2 concept improve SOCSOUTH’s ability to foster and 
achieve innovation in its approach to the RWOT? 
B. RELEVANCE 
According to the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, “Today, the 
principal terrorist enemy confronting the United States is a transnational movement of 
extremist organizations, networks, and individuals.”15  Since this terrorist enemy is not 
thwarted by national, regional, or continental borders, a TSOC such as SOCSOUTH is 
forced to conduct operations across a wide range of political and social environments.  
Prior to 9/11 much of the U.S. military, TSOCs included, was focused on conventional 
warfare involving nation-states.  The advent of the GWOT necessitated a doctrinal shift 
for the U.S. military.  The new terrorist enemy transcends national boundaries, maintains 
no formal standing army, and is devoid of any centers of gravity which might be struck.  
Simple tools such as the internet prove a remarkable enabler for these terrorist 
organizations to plan and operate at a speed and precision that their forbearers of the 
                                                 
15 The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. 
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1980s did not enjoy.16  As a result, the U.S. military was forced into a paradigm shift 
regarding how best to combat the threat of the transnational terrorist. 
SOCSOUTH’s logical question was how to organize a regionally focused special 
operations component command element to address this new threat.  “Much like the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act accomplished for our Armed Forces two decades ago, we should 
assess what new or revised authorities are needed to enhance interagency coordination, 
and build a more joint and integrated process.”17 
C. METHODOLOGY 
Following the introduction, the second chapter of this thesis provides an overview 
of the terrorism threat assessment for the entire SOUTHCOM AOR.  Each sub-region – 
the Andean Ridge (AR), the Southern Cone (SC), and the Caribbean and Central America 
(CCA) – is assessed for both its common and its region-specific characteristics.  
The third thesis chapter is dedicated to a thorough explanation of SOCSOUTH’s 
Distributive C2 concept.  This section examines the vision of SOCSOUTH’s commander, 
Brigadier General Charles Cleveland, who initiated this alternate approach.  
SOCSOUTH’s RWOT strategy is also reviewed followed by a description of its current 
C2 structure.  Additionally, chapter three provides a comprehensive examination of 
SOCSOUTH’s Distributive C2 concept by defining and listing relevant characteristics.  
This section also describes organizational changes resulting from SOCSOUTH C2 
structure, both at its headquarters and its forward operating locations.  This chapter 
concludes with a review of just what the new Distributive C2 concept entails once fully 
implemented. 
Chapters IV and V each focus on two of SOCSOUTH’s three new C2 nodes.  
Both of these chapters provide a general background on the command situation for that 
particular sub-region.  The majority of each chapter discusses proposed recommendations 
                                                 
16 Gabriel Weimann, Terror on the Internet (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 
2006). 
17 General Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Testimony before the 110th Congress, 
Senate Armed Services Committee on February 6, 2007, “Posture Statement of General Peter Pace, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” Congressional Record Daily Digest, 110th Congress, D141. 
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derived from personal observations, as well as individual interviews.  The intent of these 
recommendations is to provide constructive improvements to SOCSOUTH’s Distributive 
C2 concept.  The third C2 node, which encompasses the Caribbean and Central America, 
is not examined since it is still in the conceptual phase and SOCSOUTH has yet to begin 
any implementation. 
Chapter VI introduces several military definitions of command and control and 
provides a discussion of organizational design principles that are relevant to Distributive 
C2.  These definitions and principles are utilized to analyze SOCSOUTH’s Distributive 
C2 Concept. 
The seventh chapter focuses on identifying overarching strengths and weaknesses 
with SOCSOUTH’s Distributive C2 concept.  This chapter summarizes previous 
recommendations for improvement common to each sub-region.  Once the analysis of the 
SOCSOUTH Distributive C2 concept is complete, this thesis will propose its own long-
term Distributive C2 concept, based on SOCSOUTH’s original plan and the 
recommendations proposed by this thesis.  The goal is to further improve SOCSOUTH’s 
coordination with subordinate elements which in turn will enable greater success for its 
RWOT missions.  Consequently, SOCSOUTH’s effort should enable full integration into 
the larger USSOCOM plan for defeating global terror networks. 
 
 9
II. THE TERRORISM THREAT ASSESSMENT FOR SOCSOUTH 
If he attacks Iran, in two minutes Bush is dead…We are Muslims.  I am 
Hezbollah.  We are Muslims, and we will defend our countries at any time 
they are attacked.18 
Mustafa Khalil Meri, Young Arab 
Muslin from Paraguay, quoted in 
interview on MSNBC 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Historically, the U.S. response to economic, political, and military issues in Latin 
America and the Caribbean has varied greatly, but has generally focused on partnerships.  
America’s regional foreign policy has ranged anywhere from Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
Good Neighbor Policy to John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress.  The Bush 
Administration’s grand strategy for the SOUTHCOM AO is termed Partnership for the 
Americas.19  The current policy views most issues through the national security lens of 
the global war on terrorism (GWOT).  
Partnership for the Americas not only emphasizes partnering with nations but 
also between multiple U.S. agencies and non-government organizations (NGOs) 
operating throughout the region.  United States Southern Command’s Strategy 201620 is a 
ten-year endeavor broken down into five phases.  USSOUTHCOM recognizes that there 
is little potential for major combat operations between two or more nations in Latin 




                                                 
18 Pablo Gato and Robert Windrem, “Hezbollah Builds a Western Base: From Inside South America’s 
Tri-Border Area, Iran-linked Militia Targets U.S.,” NBC News, May 9, 2007, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17874369 (accessed September 21, 2007). 
19 U.S. Southern Command, United States Southern Command Strategy 2016. Miami, FL, March 
2007. http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/pages/ ourMission.php (accessed September 19, 2007). 
20 USSOUTHCOM, USSOUTHCOM Strategy 2016. 
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American power must now collectively focus on how the U.S. can help mitigate the 
crime, corruption, poverty, and terrorism problems that challenge “security, stability, and 
prosperity” in the region.21 
General policy statements do not completely define U.S. strategy for Latin 
America and the Caribbean because broad policies and strategies do not address the 
myriad of local issues at the country level and below.  American relations with individual 
nations in the region vary dramatically from the highest levels of cooperation on trade 
agreements and security issues on one extreme to an absence of diplomatic relations and 
trade embargos on the other.  This was a driving factor behind SOCSOUTH partitioning 
its area of responsibility into three major sub-regions.  These sub-regions include the 
Southern Cone, which includes the troublesome Tri-Border area (TBA) of Paraguay, 
Brazil, and Argentina, the Andean Ridge of northern South America, and the Caribbean 
and Central America (CCA).  Each of these sub-regions possesses unique problems that 
require multi-disciplined approaches from SOCSOUTH. 
B. THE SOUTHERN CONE 
Within the Southern Cone, USSOUTHCOM has identified internal government 
corruption at all levels and the growing presence of Islamic extremists in the largely 
ungoverned TBA as the greatest threats to U.S. national security.  According to a recent 
report to Congress, 
  
The TBA has long been used for arms and drug trafficking, contraband 
smuggling, document, and currency fraud, money laundering, and the 
manufacture and movement of pirated goods.  The terrorism report 
maintains that the United States remains concerned that Hezbollah and 
Hamas are raising funds among the sizable Muslim communities in the 
region but stated that there was no corroborated information that these or 
other Islamic extremist groups had an operational presence in the area.  





                                                 
21 USSOUTHCOM, USSOUTHCOM Strategy 2016. 
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1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires that killed 30 
people and the 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association 
in Buenos Aires that killed 85 people.22 
In addition, a recent investigation by NBC news supports claims of an extensive 
smuggling network operated by Hezbollah in this area.  This joint Telemundo/NBC 
investigation discovered that “the operation funnels large sums of money to militia 
leaders in the Middle East and finances training camps, propaganda operations and bomb 
attacks in South America.”23  The report also details how these individuals carry Latin 
American passports, speak Spanish, and generally pass themselves off as Hispanic.  This 
fact has major implications when coupled with the current U.S. immigration reform 
debate.  If undocumented migrant workers can illegally enter the United States seemingly 
with ease, then logically the same holds true for terrorists. 
At this time Hezbollah is designated by the U.S. State Department as a terrorist 
organization.  Clearly Hezbollah is taking advantage of the ungoverned space and the 
lucrative drug and human smuggling trade networks that extend through to the Andean 
Ridge, Central America, and the Caribbean.  This terrorist organization is already known 
to have a presence in the United States.24  Prior to 9/11, Hezbollah was responsible for 
more American deaths than Al Qaeda.  While one operation in the United States was 
derailed by law enforcement,25 given Hezbollah’s tenacity it is likely that they are 
continuing to operate from within America’s borders. 
To help combat terrorist operations the governments of Paraguay, Argentina, 
Brazil, and the United States, have committed to regional cooperation through the “3+1” 
mechanism on security in the Tri-Border Area.  In December 2006, delegations from 
these nations met and established a comprehensive strategy for containing terrorism and 
                                                 
22 Congressional Research Service, Latin America: Terrorism Issues, by Mark P. Sullivan 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 22, 2007). 
23 Gato and Windrem, “Hezbollah Builds a Western Base.” 
24 Daniel Pipes, “Hezbollah in America: An Alarming Network,” The National Review Online (August 
28, 2000), http://www.danielpipes.org/ article/349 (accessed September 25, 2007). 
25 David Asman, “Hezbollah Inside America: FOX News Tells All in Documentary,” Fox News, 18 
January 2007, http://www.foxnews.com/ printer_friendly_story/0,3566,244002,00.html (accessed 
September 25, 2007). 
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other illegal activities in the TBA.26  Unfortunately, it is too early to ascertain  
whether the 3+1 group’s effort will bear any fruit. 
C. THE ANDEAN RIDGE 
The highly profitable cocaine trade prominent in the Andean Ridge is one of the 
main enterprises fueling smuggling networks in the TBA.  The illegal Andean drug 
industry has deeply penetrated the global markets and is currently helping to sustain 
violent guerrilla groups such as Las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia 
(FARC) (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and El Ejército de Liberación 
Nacional (ELN) (National Liberation Army).  Both FARC and ELN have been 
designated terrorist organizations by the U.S. State Department.  Although they have lost 
some momentum recently, both groups continue to pose a threat to the Colombian 
government and American forces stationed there. 
Due to an enduring relationship with Colombia, however, the United States is able 
to collaborate on issues of major concern to both.  The Andean Counterdrug Initiative 
(ACI) is the primary U.S. program that supports Plan Colombia and is largely focused on 
combating drug trafficking and spurring economic development in the region.  According 
to recent reporting, 90% of all cocaine that reaches the United States originates or passes 
through Colombia.27  The cocaine produced in the Andean Ridge moves through two 
main corridors in the CCA, the Mexico-Central American corridor and the Caribbean 
corridor (see Figure 2). 
                                                 
26 U.S. Department of State, Communiqué of the 3+1 group on Tri-border Area Security, Prepared by 
the Counterterrorism Office, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/39706.htm (accessed June 8, 2007). 
27 Congressional Research Service, “Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) and Related Funding 




Figure 2.   Cocaine Flows to the United States in 200328 
 
D. THE CARIBBEAN AND CENTRAL AMERICA 
While the Southern Cone, Andean Ridge, and CCA each have distinct security 
concerns, these issues are all interrelated.  Stability in the Andean Ridge directly 
translates into interdiction worries for the CCA.  In order for drug cartels to move their 
product into the U.S., drug dealers use the extensive smuggling networks that spread 
throughout Central America and the Caribbean.  The CCA is host to thousands of points 
of origin from which illegal drugs and human cargo are transported into the United 
States.  Revenue generated from the drug trade can potentially flow back to Islamic 
extremists operating from within the Southern Cone’s TBA and help finance terrorist 
operations throughout the western hemisphere.  In addition, the CCA is host to a growing 
gang problem that spans Mexico and the United States. 
To help combat these threats USSOUTHCOM has a semi-permanent joint task 
force (JTF Bravo) at Soto Cano Air Base, Honduras in order to provide security 
assistance to partner nations in Central America.  
                                                 
28 U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Threat Assessment 2005 Summary Report, Prepared by 
the National Drug Intelligence Center, February 2005, http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs11/ 
13846/cocaine.htm (accessed June 8, 2007). 
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While not directly related to drug interdiction, the United States has several 
mostly economic collateral missions which affect relations in the CCA.  For example, the 
U.S. has a trade embargo with Cuba that dates back to 1961.  However, Cuba recently 
discovered large quantities of oil within its territory.  A 2006 report by the U.S. 
Geological Survey confirmed that, “the North Cuba Basin held a substantial quantity of 
oil — 4.6 billion to 9.3 billion barrels of crude and 9.8 trillion to 21.8 trillion cubic feet of 
natural gas.”29  This recent discovery could have a far-reaching impact on the U.S. 
position towards Cuba given that other countries such as China, India, Norway, Spain, 
Canada, Venezuela, and Brazil have already shown interest in this new find.  
An example of a more cooperative economic enterprise is the Central America-
Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR).  Thus far 
membership has been extended to Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.  This trade agreement is the second largest U.S. 
export market in Latin America behind a similar one with Mexico.30  The countries 
affected by CAFTA-DR are some of the poorest in the region.  In order for this endeavor 
to succeed the U.S. must focus on poverty reduction through a host of civil programs 
throughout the region. 
E.  CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, there are several programs favorable to the United States in Latin 
America and the Caribbean.  These are focused on economic development, regional 
security and stability, crime and corruption issues, and trade negotiations.  However, 
when crafting strategies at the country level and below, a certain degree of ambiguity 
arises between the U.S. Departments of State and Defense as to which is the lead 
agency.31  This difficulty comes to light when both departments have concurrent presence 
                                                 
29 Todd Lewan, “Cuban Discovery Could Pour Oil on Troubled Waters,” Associated Press, July 30, 
2006, http://www.signonsandiego.com/ uniontrib/20060730/news1n30oil.html (accessed April 28, 2007). 
30 Free Trade Agreement, “U.S. CAFTA-DR Free Trade Agreement, How can U.S. Companies 
Benefit,” U.S. Government Export Portal, http://www.export.gov/fta/CAFTA/index.asp?dName=CAFTA 
(accessed April 29, 2007). 
31 Robert B. Oakley and Michael Casey, Jr., “The Country Team: Restructuring America’s First Line 
of Engagement,” Joint Forces Quarterly 47 (4th Quarter 2007): 149-151. 
 15
and conflicting programs or operations in a particular sub-region or country.  Conflict 
resolution usually results from internal bureaucratic compromises. 
National policy should place more emphasis on the sub-regional rather than the 
regional level.  A shift in focus from big to small could have a positive impact where the 
real policy decisions are implemented.  Success requires the unified efforts of numerous 
American entities employed in the region through carefully coordinated campaigns 
developed at each country team. 
 16
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III.  SOCSOUTH’S DISTRIBUTIVE COMMAND AND CONTROL 
CONCEPT 
The Romans said, and I quote, “If you would have peace, you must be 
prepared for war.”  And while we pray for peace, we can never forget that 
organization, no less than a bayonet or an aircraft carrier, is a weapon of 
war.  We owe it to our soldiers, our sailors, our airmen, and our marines to 
ensure that this weapon is lean enough, flexible enough, and tough enough 
to help them win, if God forbid, that even becomes necessary.32 
Congressman Bill Nichols, Hearings 
for the Goldwater-Nichols Act, 1986. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, SOCSOUTH proposed, “the need to establish a flat, networked 
command and control architecture that incorporates multiple, tailored C2 nodes spread 
throughout South America.”33  To describe this C2 arrangement they have coined the 
term “distributive C2.”  SOCSOUTH has determined that their current organizational 
structure is inadequate to respond effectively to emerging problems throughout the region 
based on taskings from USSOUTHCOM.  
The term commonly used to describe their approach prior to distributive C2 is 
“swarmballing.”34  The premise behind “swarmball” is elementary: when a crisis arises 
whatever staff personnel are least busy are thrown at the problem.  While expedient, the 
downside to this ad hoc method is that typically these individuals have little expertise 
with the country in question. 
Distributive C2 transcends much of the traditionally accepted command and 
control concepts published in joint military doctrine.  It also illustrates an important 
cultural transformation by some senior military leaders with regards to how the U.S. 
                                                 
32 Congressman Bill Nichols, Opening statement for the House Armed Services Committee on 
February 19, 1986, “Reorganization of the Department of Defense,” Congressional Record, 99th Congress, 
2d session, no. 99-53. 
33 Captain Paul Brister, “Information Paper.” 
34 Based on several interviews conducted at SOCSOUTH Headquarters, Homestead Air Reserve Base, 
FL, on May 7, 2007. 
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military integrates with other government agencies and partner nation colleagues towards 
a unified strategy for the SOUTHCOM AOR. 
This chapter analyses SOCSOUTH’s distributive C2 concept.  It begins with the 
vision of Brigadier General (BG) Charles Cleveland, SOCSOUTH’s commanding 
general, who initiated this concept.  Additionally, this chapter reviews SOCSOUTH’s 
RWOT strategy followed by a description of the organization’s current C2 structure.  
This section then transitions to a detailed explanation of all facets of the SOCSOUTH 
distributive C2 concept.  This chapter concludes with a review of the resulting 
organizational structure stemming from SOCSOUTH’s command and control endeavors. 
B. BRIGADIER GENERAL CLEVELAND’S C2 POLYGON 
After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, USSOCOM was tasked by the Secretary of 
Defense to plan and execute the global war on terror.  As previously discussed, 
USSOCOM’s response in part, was to dramatically increase the size of its headquarters 
staff.  Additionally, in May 2003 USSOCOM created the Center for Special Operations 
(CSO), to oversee this new role as a supported combatant command.35  The CSO 
“combines the intelligence (J2), operations (J3), and planning (J5) functions...  [and 
serves] both as a force providing element and a GWOT warfighting cell.”36  At the CSO, 
liaison officers (LNOs) from multiple government agencies facilitate interagency 
coordination for counterterror efforts. 
The CSO, however, does not have C2 of the majority of the SOF forces executing 
the GWOT.  Most SOF are controlled by Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC) 
that are components within each of DoD’s geographic combatant commands (GCCs).  
BG Cleveland labels this approach to the GWOT C2 as “The Raid” because this is how 
most direct action missions, such as raids, are conducted (See Figure 3).37   
                                                 
35 U.S. Special Operations Command, “Center for Special Operations (J2/J3/J5) (SCSO),” Special 
Operations Reference Manual, Hurlbert Field, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, June 2005: 
Chapter 2-5. 
36 U.S. Special Operations Command, “Center for Special Operations,” Chapter 2-5. 
37 Brigadier General Charles Cleveland (Commander, Special Operations Command South), interview 
by authors, SOCSOUTH Headquarters, Homestead Air Reserve Base, FL, on May 7, 2007. 
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Top-down directives, large higher headquarters, executive level interagency  
coordination are indicative of the Raid approach. 
 
Figure 3.   Current USSOCOM Approach to GWOT C238 
 
SOCSOUTH’s commanding general, however, has a different view of how 
headquarters should be staffed to lead the GWOT.  BG Cleveland’s method, entitled 
“The Long War,” is a bottom-up structure with the majority of all interagency 
coordination occurring at the lowest level possible.39  In addition, his vision projects his 
staff officers forward into theater, a bold step towards decentralized execution.  As 
discussed in the thesis introduction, each sub-region within Cleveland’s AO has unique 
cultural and political characteristics that keep a top-down, centralized plan from being as 
effective as possible.  SOCSOUTH offers a smaller, more agile focus centered on U.S. 
Embassy country teams (See Figure 4).  This is something that a larger, more 
cumbersome headquarters such as USSOCOM is unable to achieve. 
                                                 
38 Brigadier General Charles Cleveland, note given to authors, SOCSOUTH Headquarters, Homestead 
Air Reserve Base, FL, May 7, 2007. 
39 BG Cleveland, note given to authors. 
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Figure 4.   BG Cleveland’s Approach to GWOT C240 
 
C.  THE SOCSOUTH RWOT STRATEGY 
SOCSOUTH has deemed its overall strategy in its regional war on terror to be a 
“layered defense of the homeland”41 with the homeland being the United States (see 
Figure 5).  According to SOUTHCOM’s Theater Security Cooperation Plan42 and 
Command Strategy 201643, the three layers of this strategy are: disruption in the Southern 
Cone sub-region, stabilization in the Andean Ridge, and interdiction in the Caribbean and 
Central America. 
                                                 
40 BG Cleveland, note given to authors. 
41 Special Operations Command-South Joint Operations Division, “Special Operations SOUTH 
Distributive Command and Control COA Development,” PowerPoint Presentation, Homestead Air Reserve 
Base, FL, 2007. 
42 U.S. Southern Command, Theater Security Cooperation Plan, Miami, FL, June 2007, 
http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/pages/theaterSecurity.php (accessed September 19, 2007). 
43 USSOUTHCOM, USSOUTHCOM Strategy 2016. 
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Figure 5.   SOCSOUTH Layered Defense Strategy 
 
The purpose of SOCSOUTH’s efforts in the Southern Cone (SC) is to disrupt 
transnational terrorist activities.  The SC sub-region includes the South American 
countries of Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay.  Special operations forces 
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in this area integrate their operations with other USG and partner nation government 
activities.  These same SOF forces also serve as advisors in regional shaping 
operations.44 
In the Andean Ridge (AR), SOCSOUTH is focused on maintaining or increasing 
the stability of existing governments within the sub-region through a sustained SOF 
presence, as well as the targeting of high value narco-terrorist leaders.  The AR is 
comprised of the nations of Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia.  Here SOF 
forces provide coordination, counterterror planning assistance, intelligence support, 
operational preparation of the environment (OPE), and inter-agency liaison to many of 
these Andean governments.  In addition, Joint and Combined Exchange Training (JCETs) 
are used to build relationships and maintain partner nation capacity.45 
To accomplish its drug interdiction role in the Caribbean and Central American 
(CCA) zone, SOCSOUTH has two focused efforts.  In Central America, SOF is used to 
increase US and partner capabilities by providing training at regional training centers, 
leveraging existing partner facilities, and funding new equipment and additional training.  
SOF also advises partner nation counterterror units and ensures they are capable of acting 
on behalf of internal security interests.  In the Caribbean, interdiction is accomplished 
through the integrated efforts of the Joint Interagency Task Force-South’s (JIATF-S) 
counter-drug operations.  These SOF elements provide full-time vessel support as well as 
maritime visit, board, search, and seize capabilities.46 
Since disruption, stability, and interdiction operations all require different military 
assets, SOCSOUTH recognizes that these three distinct missions may also require 
different command and control arrangements.  As a result, SOCSOUTH has eschewed a 
traditional military “one size fits all” approach with its Distributive C2 concept. 
                                                 
44 SOCSOUTH JOD, “SOCSOUTH Distributive C2 COA Development.” 
45 SOCSOUTH JOD, “SOCSOUTH Distributive C2 COA Development.” 
46 SOCSOUTH JOD, “SOCSOUTH Distributive C2 COA Development.” 
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D. ANALYSIS OF THE PREVIOUS SOCSOUTH C2 STRUCTURE 
Before initiating its Distributive C2 concept, SOCSOUTH followed traditional 
doctrinal methods with regards to structuring command and control.  The SOCSOUTH 
headquarters staff was organized along standard functional lines, as is typical of most US 
military staffs.  Each staff function, be it command, administration, intelligence, 
operations, logistics, communications, etc., had its own joint directorate. 
SOCSOUTH’s operations directorate, or J3, was divided into three divisions: the 
Readiness and Exercise Division, the Joint Operations Division (JOD), and the Special 
Activities Division.  All matters related to current and future operations were managed 
from within the JOD.47 
The JOD was, and still is, the center of gravity for the execution of the 
SOCSOUTH commander’s strategy and the C2 of all SOF operating with its AO.48  
Previously the JOD was further task divided along functional lines – current operations, 
future operations, air operations, etc. – but in each case staffed only with enough 
personnel to focus on priority tasks.  This led staff officers in the JOD to become Jacks-
of-all-trades but masters of none.  The end result was the aforementioned 
“swarmballing”. 
From its headquarters near Miami, FL, SOCSOUTH primarily oversaw the 
activities of its subordinate elements operating in theater.  Each individual SOF element 
reported up to SOCSOUTH HQ for additional guidance, authority, and support that it 
could not obtain locally.  SOCSOUTH did however previously deploy two small forward 
C2 elements into theater briefly (See Figure 6).  Nonetheless, these elements were 
focused on specific missions inside single countries rather than being regionally focused.  
Consequently these forward C2 elements did not oversee the activities of other SOF 
elements operating within its area of interest outside its particular country.49 
                                                 
47 Special Operations Command-South Joint Operations Division, “Special Operations SOUTH 
Distributive Command and Control Joint Operations Division Reorganization,” PowerPoint Presentation, 
Homestead Air Reserve Base, FL, 2007. 
48 SOCSOUTH JOD, “SOCSOUTH Distributive C2 JOD Reorganization.” 
49 SOCSOUTH JOD, “SOCSOUTH Distributive C2 JOD Reorganization.” 
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Figure 6.   SOCSOUTH Overall C2 Structure – Current 
 
The JOD’s ability to provide sub-regional situational awareness to the 
SOCSOUTH commander was limited due to its being a functionally oriented 
organization, manned only for priority tasks, consisting of multiple subordinate elements 
reporting to a single location.  For example, prior to implementing its Distributive C2 
concept, SOCSOUTH’s JOD Chief would post the various daily situation reports 
(SITREPs) from its subordinate units deployed into theater.  However, since none of the 
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JOD personnel were permanently assigned to monitor a particular country or sub-region, 
they had no sense of ownership and waited to be assigned a particular operation or 
crisis—swarmball ensued.  This hampered the commanding general’s ability to execute 
his RWOT.50  As detailed in subsequent sections of this thesis, the new Distributive C2 
concept amends this by assigning each JOD member to a specific sub-region, thereby 
giving that individual a stake in the same.   
E. DISTRIBUTIVE C2 DEFINED 
In early 2006, SOCSOUTH personnel sought to determine what exactly 
“distributive C2” meant to their operations.  Staff officers concluded their definition to be 
“a flat, networked command and control architecture that incorporates multiple, tailored 
C2 nodes, facilitates rapid decision making, interagency coordination and proper 
resourcing of special operations forces operating over vast geographic areas in support of 
the RWOT.”51 
Within SOCSOUTH’s definition, distributive C2 has the following 
characteristics:52 
• Capable of conducting interagency coordination at regional and country team 
levels 
• Able to interface at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. 
• Emphasizes the local solution with commanders at forward locations with 
sufficient [command] authorities and resources to conduct operations. 
• Have a small [logistics] footprint and the ability to operate with low visibility. 
• Maximizes reach back to SOCSOUTH headquarters. 
• Networked both vertically and horizontally to maximize intelligence sharing. 
• Requires a regional focus. 
                                                 
50 SOCSOUTH JOD, “SOCSOUTH Distributive C2 JOD Reorganization.” 
51 SOCSOUTH JOD, “SOCSOUTH Distributive C2 COA Development.” 
52 SOCSOUTH JOD, “SOCSOUTH Distributive C2 COA Development.” 
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• Conduct operations over long durations (traditional joint task force C2 
configurations are not conducive to this). 
F. DISTRIBUTIVE C2 AT SOCSOUTH HEADQUARTERS 
The implementation plan for the overall distributive C2 concept consists of two 
parts.  The first aspect reorganizes the JOD from a functionally focused task organization 
to a regionally centered one.  Previously, the various JOD sub-elements focused on 




Figure 7.   The Old J3 Directorate Task Organization 
 
The nucleus of the new construct, however, is the creation of three Regional 
Engagement Branches (REBs), one for each sub-region.  In addition to the three REBs, 
the JOD will also maintain a future operations cell, a personnel recovery cell, and a GCC 
support cell.  The future operations cell will continue to conduct all near- and long-term 
planning, maintain all AOR-wide operational plans, and accomplish planning for civil 
affairs (CA) and psychological operations (PSYOPS) (See Figure 8).53 
 
                                                 
53 SOCSOUTH JOD, “SOCSOUTH Distributive C2 JOD Reorganization.” 
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Figure 8.   The New J3 Directorate Task Organization 
 
The regional focus of each REB allows it to track current operations, gain 
regional expertise, and integrate into the country teams located within its sub-region.  The 
REB can also serve as a deployable C2 package to surge into its sub-region to 
supplement existing SOCSOUTH command elements already in place.  The REBs will 
also have the following capabilities:54 
• Detailed tracking of current operations. 
• Development and/or approval of operational concepts. 
• Reception of mission in-briefs and out-briefs of deployed SOF in their sub-
region. 
• Coordination and scheduling of airlift assets. 
• Coordination of SOF operations with other SOUTHCOM forces [in theater]. 
• Building and maintaining relationships with embassy country teams. 
• Conduct and coordinate in-country assessments and VIP visits. 
                                                 
54 Special Operations Command-South Joint Operations Division, “Configuring the TSOC to CS the 
RWOT,” PowerPoint Presentation, Homestead Air Reserve Base, FL, 2007. 
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• Providing support to SOCSOUTH intelligence assets. 
• Coordinating and building relationships with regional experts located in the 
other [functional] sections of the SOCSOUTH staff. 
G. DISTRIBUTIVE C2 BY SUB-REGION 
The second aspect for implementing SOCSOUTH’s Distributive C2 concept is 
centered on establishing forward deployed command and control nodes.  These C2 nodes, 
or SOC Forwards (SOCFWDs), coordinate directly with each REB and oversee all SOF 
operations within its sub-region.  To reiterate, one node, is dedicated to the Andean 
Ridge, one to the Southern Cone, and two smaller C2 cells to the Caribbean and Central 
America (one in each area).  The SOCFWDs in the Andean Ridge and the Southern Cone 
are in the early stages of implementation, while the C2 cells in the CCA are still in the 
conceptual phase.  For purposes of operational security, the location of these SOCFWDs 
may not be disclosed. 
Each SOCFWD/C2 node is empowered with certain command authorities to 
streamline the execution of special operations.  Specifically, the node synchronizes all 
missions with strategic objectives as determined by the commanding general.  In addition 
to the ability to authorize and C2 operations, each C2 node will have the ability to 
provide some logistical support to its assigned SOF elements.  Also, the SOCFWDs will 
have small intelligence and administrative capabilities and the authority to coordinate 
with the appropriate US Embassy or partner nation agencies for additional support needs.  
Lastly, each C2 element will possess the capability to send and receive communications 
through a variety of mediums twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.55 
1. The Andean Ridge 
The first sub-region allocated a SOCFWD C2 node was the Andean Ridge.  
Currently, the AR node is dedicated to personnel recovery and high value target “snatch 
and grab” operations.  However, at a time to be determined by SOCSOUTH’s 
                                                 
55 SOCSOUTH personnel, interview by authors, SOCSOUTH Headquarters, Homestead Air Reserve 
Base, FL, on May 7, 2007.  Based on operational security reasons, all interviews were conducted in 
confidentiality with the names of interviewees being withheld. 
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Commanding General, this node will transition operations to include the full scope of the 
Distributive C2 concept.  Consequently, the AR C2 node will encompass all SOF 
elements operating within its sub-region.  Additionally, the Andean Ridge SOCFWD will 
begin coordinating and synchronizing SOF operations with relevant US Embassy country 
team members, non-government organizations (NGOs), and PN agencies.56 
When fully operational, the AR C2 node will have operational control of all SOF 
operating within its sub-region.  This SOCFWD will be the focal point between the 
SOCSOUTH headquarters at Homestead Air Reserve Base (HARB) and SOF operating 
within the sub-region (see Figure 9).  It will also maintain regional situational awareness, 
make assessments on partner nation capabilities, and support intelligence operations.57 
Currently, this C2 node resides inside the US embassy compound of one of the 
countries in its sub-region.  For force protection issues only, SOCFWD is under the 
tactical control of the Security Assistance Organization operating in that US Embassy and 
has a memorandum of agreement (MOA) with it for some minor administrative and 
logistical support. 
                                                 
56 SOCSOUTH JOD, “SOCSOUTH Distributive C2 COA Development.” 
57 SOCSOUTH JOD, “SOCSOUTH Distributive C2 JOD Reorganization.” 
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Figure 9.   The Andean Ridge SOC Forward Concept 
 
2. The Southern Cone 
The second of these SOCFWD C2 nodes was established in the Southern Cone.  
This element’s operations are currently focused on the Tri-Border Area of Brazil, 
Paraguay, and Argentina.  Once fully operational, this SOCFWD node will be 
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responsible for the command and control of all SOF operating with the Southern Cone 
sub-region.  As with its Andean counterpart, this SOCFWD will also be responsible for 
the coordination and synchronization of all SO within its AOR. 
When fully operational as a SOCFWD, this C2 node will also have operational 
control for all SOF operating within the SC.  It will also be responsible for ensuring that 
all unconventional warfare shaping operations are nested and synchronized within the 
RWOT plan, maintaining regional situational awareness, and developing operational 
counters to Tri-Border threats (see Figure 10).58 
As with its Andean Ridge counterpart, this C2 node also resides inside the US 
embassy compound of the one of the countries in its specific sub-region.  A virtually 
identical agreement exists between the SOCFWD and the applicable Security Assistance 
Organization with regards to force protection and other levels of minor support. 
 
                                                 
58 SOCSOUTH JOD, “SOCSOUTH Distributive C2 JOD Reorganization.” 
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Figure 10.   The Southern Cone SOC Forward Concept 
 
3. The Caribbean and Central America 
While still in the conceptual phase, the SOCFWD structure for the Caribbean and 
Central American (CCA) area is unique.  Within this sub-region there will be two smaller 
C2 cells reporting to the CCA REB at SOCSOUTH headquarters.  One of these CCA C2 
cells will operate inside the Caribbean while the other will be located on the mainland in 
Central America.  Once moved from the conceptual to the operational phase, the task of 
these two C2 cells will be the same, namely the command and control of all SOF 
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operating within its AOR.  Each will also be responsible for synchronizing and 
coordinating all special operations within it sub-region.59 
The reason for having these two small C2 cells, as opposed to one larger 
SOCFWD, is the CCA’s two distinct operating environments.  While both support the 
overall task of drug interdiction, in Central America this objective is accomplished 
through the use of ground forces, while in the Caribbean this is achieved with maritime 
elements.  Hence the two separate C2 cells. 
Despite their smaller size, these C2 cells will still possess many of the same 
responsibilities and capabilities of the larger SOCFWDs.  Each cell will have operational 
control of all SOF in its AOR, will maintain regional situational awareness, and develop 
operational concepts for interdiction operations (see Figure 11).60 
Similar to the other two C2 nodes, SOCSOUTH intends for each of these C2 cells 
to also reside within a US Embassy compound in a country within its AO.  As with the 
two SOCFWDs, these two CCA C2 cells will be under the tactical control of the 
applicable U.S. Embassy’s Security Assistance Organization only with regards to force 
protection issues.  Additionally, these cells will also maintain MOAs for minor 
administrative support.61 
                                                 
59 SOCSOUTH JOD, “SOCSOUTH Distributive C2 JOD Reorganization.” 
60 SOCSOUTH JOD, “SOCSOUTH Distributive C2 JOD Reorganization.” 
61 SOCSOUTH JOD, “SOCSOUTH Distributive C2 JOD Reorganization.” 
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Figure 11.   The CCA C2 Cell Concept 
 
H. REVIEW OF THE NEW OVERALL SOCSOUTH DISTRIBUTIVE C2 
STRUCTURE 
The overall Distributive C2 concept is an effort to acquire regional expertise, 
develop regional as opposed to task focus, and improve the speed at which tactical 
operations are planned, resourced, and authorized.  As discussed previously, due to 
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cultural and political sensitivities, SOCSOUTH believes a regional orientation to be 
superior to a task organized one.  As a result, the new C2 arrangements are the same or 
very similar but they allow different approaches to develop in each sub-region.   
Additionally, rather than a multitude of SOF elements reporting up to the JOD for 
action, support, and assistance, this Distributive C2 concept attempts to push assets away 
from SOCSOUTH headquarters and into the actual theater of operations. 
The chain of command and support now moves from the individual SOF element 
operating in a particular country to its sub-region’s SOCFWD/C2 cell.  The SOCFWD 
then reports to SOCSOUTH through their respective REB.  As many issues as possible 
will be resolved at the C2 node level.  This chain works in reverse for issues generated 
from the top-down (see Figure 12). 
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Figure 12.   The SOCSOUTH Distributive C2 Concept 
 
I. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter was to explain the SOCSOUTH Distributive C2 
concept.  This chapter began with Brigadier General Cleveland’s vision of what the C2 
structure for the GWOT should be centered on.  This vision was the catalyst for his 
Distributive C2 concept.  After BG Cleveland’s vision, the SOCSOUTH strategy for its 
RWOT was reviewed, followed by a description of the current SOCSOUTH C2 structure.  
This chapter then provided SOCSOUTH’s refined definition of Distributive C2 and its 
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characteristics.  Then the chapter detailed the task, purpose, and responsibilities for each 
of the two parts of this new concept: the establishment of REBs within the JOD and the 
creation of SOWFWDs/C2 nodes within each sub-region.  This chapter concluded with a 
review of the end state for SOCSOUTH’s fully operational C2 structure. 
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IV. SOCSOUTH C2 NODE IN THE ANDEAN RIDGE 
How important it is to take scraps of seemingly disparate information from 
widely different locations, piece them together, work them in a timely 
way, and then be poised, cocked, and ready to move in a matter of minutes 
or hours, not days or weeks, because time-sensitive targets don’t wait.62 
Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld, in reference to the capture 
of Saddam Hussein 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Although operationally still in its infancy, the Andean Ridge C2 node is the 
linchpin of SOCSOUTH’s initial distributive C2 endeavor.  This sub-region includes the 
countries of Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia.  As previously discussed, 
it is a vital area of operations because, among other things “[v]irtually all of the Andean 
Ridge nations are suffering from one or more of the multifaceted threats of drug 
trafficking, insurgency, paramilitary violence, kidnapping, and common crime.”63  As 
evidenced by long term programs such as the $1.3B Plan Colombia64 and the $782M 
Andean Ridge Initiative,65 South America’s Andean Ridge plays a substantial role in the 
U.S. National Security Strategy.66     
                                                 
62 Rowan Scarborough, Rumsfeld’s War: The Untold Story of America’s Anti-Terrorist Commander 
(Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2004), 62. 
63 William Spracher, “The Andean Ridge:  The Perfect Training Lab for Latin American FAOs,” 
Foreign Affairs Officer Association Journal (August 2005), http://faoa.org/journal/andeanr.html (accessed 
August 17, 2007). 
64 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Support for Plan Columbia. Prepared by the Embassy of the United 
States, Bogotá, Columbia, date unknown. https://colombia.cms3.getusinfo.com/topics_of_interest/plan-
colombia-full-text-documents/toipc_002.html (accessed August 21, 2007). 
65 U.S. Department of State, Andean Regional Initiative, Prepared by the Embassy of the United 
States, Bogotá, Colombia, March 23, 2002, https://colombia.cms3.getusinfo.com/topics_of_interest/plan-
colombia-press-bulletins/toipc230302.html (accessed August 21, 2007).  
66 President George Bush, “Work with others to Defuse Regional Conflicts,” National Security 
Strategy of the United States of America, Section 4, September 17, 2002, 
http://whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss4.html (accessed August 23, 2007).  
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This chapter describes SOCSOUTH’s initial steps with regards to establishing a 
SOCFWD command and control node in the Andean Ridge.  The chapter also provides 
additional considerations for full implementation of the Andean Ridge C2 node.  It 
concludes with the impact of the node thus far on subordinate units, U.S. Embassy 
country team members, and partner nation counterparts. 
B. SOCSOUTH’S INITIAL STEPS FOR ITS ANDEAN RIDGE C2 NODE 
While the Andean Ridge C2 node is far from being fully operational, 
SOCSOUTH is taking measured steps to establish its staff presence there.  Currently four 
of the standard military staff functions reside within the Andean C2 node.  The bulk of 
these personnel function from within the operations cell (J3), with intelligence (J2), 
logistics (J4), and communications (J6) staff officers providing less of a presence.67  
None of these personnel are permanently assigned to the US Embassy but rather on 
temporary assignment from SOCSOUTH Headquarters.  In contrast, its Embassy country 
team counterparts are typically assigned permanently for two year tours.  The entire node 
is commanded by an officer in the grade of O-6 which is appropriate due to scope of the 
Andean Ridge operation and is on par with conventional DoD counterparts within the 
Embassy.  The SOCFWD chief is also assigned a deputy chief and a noncommissioned 
officer in charge. 
1. Manning Levels 
As with any new process, SOCSOUTH’s Distributive C2 concept is not without 
its challenges.  With regards to the Andean Ridge node, manpower levels are a primary 
concern for operations there.  In personal interviews, the node’s current leadership 
estimates that there are about half of the staff officers on station required to expand the 
Distributive C2 concept beyond the borders of the partner nation and truly assume 
regional responsibilities.  Among the staff functions expected to increase manning levels 
                                                 
67 SOCSOUTH personnel, interview by authors, Andean Ridge Sub-region, on July 30, 2007.  Based 
on operational security reasons, all interviews were conducted in confidentiality with the names and 
specific locations of interviewees being withheld. 
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are intelligence, operations, logistics, and communications personnel.68  To its credit 
SOCSOUTH appears to be taking very aggressive, proactive measures to mitigate these 
manning concerns for the future.   
2. Permanent Party Status for Node Leadership  
An item for further consideration by SOCSOUTH Headquarters is assigning the 
node’s commander and deputy commander to the U.S. Embassy on a permanent basis.  
Unlike the other DoD components at the Embassy, the leadership of SOCSOUTH’s 
Andean C2 node is on temporary assignment.  Currently tour lengths for node leadership 
vary anywhere from four to eight months.69  According the SOCFWD’s leadership, 
currently there are no plans to change existing practices by assigning personnel 
permanently.70  Through the course of other interviews some personnel believed that this 
lack of continuity in node leadership is disruptive to relations with SOCSOUTH’s 
subordinate units as well as with the other DoD elements at the Embassy.71  Each new 
incoming node commander brings with him his own management style, expectations, and 
interpretation of the CG’s intent and guidance.   
This assessment has merit and bears further investigation by SOCSOUTH.  A 
possible solution is to make those two leadership billets staggered, two year tours.  This 
arrangement has the potential to mitigate simultaneous reassignment of the node’s 
leadership.  The existing Status of Forces Agreement with the partner nation may 
possibly derail efforts of this nature, however. 
3. Assigning a Contracting Officer to the Node  
As the Andean Ridge C2 node grows ever more robust, the addition of a 
contracting officer in the logistics cell may be warranted.  Depending on the type of 
administrative or logistical support required, subordinate elements collocated with the 
Andean SOCFWD must either process requests through the DoD’s Security Assistance 
                                                 
68 SOCSOUTH personnel, interview by authors, Andean Ridge Sub-region, on July 31, 2007. 
69 SOCSOUTH personnel, interview by authors, Andean Ridge Sub-region, on July 31, 2007. 
70 SOCSOUTH personnel, interview by authors, Andean Ridge Sub-region, on July 31, 2007. 
71 SOCSOUTH personnel, interview by authors, Andean Ridge Sub-region, on July 30, 2007. 
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Organization (SAO) on site, SOCSOUTH Headquarters in Miami, or its parent unit in the 
United States.72  While a warranted contracting officer won’t serve as the “be all and end 
all” it has the potential to streamline, and subsequently hasten, support to SOCSOUTH’s 
tactical elements. 
4. Additional Workspace 
Furthermore, additional manpower at the Andean Ridge C2 node will require 
additional workspace.  Even with its current complement of personnel, the entire node 
does not share the same office space.  This may lead to “disconnects” with regards to 
maintaining a unified strategic direction within the node.  It is recommended that 
SOCSOUTH personnel continue to lobby for more space in or around the Embassy 
grounds. 
5. Air Assets 
Additionally, augmenting the Andean Ridge SOCFWD with special operations air 
assets in theater has the potential to dramatically increase the response time and 
operational effectiveness of operations of a time sensitive nature.  Not since the MH-
60Ds of Company D, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) departed 
Puerto Rico’s Roosevelt Roads Naval Station in 2003 has SOCSOUTH had a SOF air 
component permanently stationed in its area of operations.73  Existing SOCSOUTH 
leadership at the Andean node identified benefits to the permanent presence of SOF fixed 
wing assets such as MC-130s and AC-130 gunships, as well as, for the return of rotary 
wing aircraft.74  For sake of comparison, SOCSOUTH’s counterparts in U.S. European 
(USEUCOM) and Pacific Commands (USPACOM) both possess a permanently assigned 
squadron each of MC-130H Combat Talon II and MC-130P Combat Shadow aircraft to 
                                                 
72 SOCSOUTH personnel, interview by authors, Andean Ridge Sub-region, on July 30, 2007. 
73 U.S. Army Special Operations Command, “Special Ops aviation unit traverses Bermuda Triangle en 
route to new home”, News Service Release Number 03082525 (August 2003), http://news.soc.mil/releases/ 
News%20Archive/2003/03AUG/030825-01.htm (accessed August 22, 2007). 
74 SOCSOUTH personnel, interview by authors, Andean Ridge Sub-region, on July 31, 2007. 
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their area of operations.75  Additionally, USEUCOM has the added benefit of the 
venerable MH-53J/M Pave Low heavy lift helicopter for the insertion and extraction of 
special operations personnel.76  These units are under the operational control of their 
respective theater special operations commands.77 
6. Integration into the Embassy Country Team 
The final ingredients for successful implementation of SOCSOUTH’s Andean 
Ridge C2 node are a strategic communications plan and a formal agreement for 
integration of SOCSOUTH element personnel into the U.S. Embassy country team.  
Currently, SOCSOUTH’s forward operations there are seen as a “ghost organization” 
throughout the Embassy population as a whole.78  The successes thus far have largely 
been personality driven since no mechanism exists to establish formal lines of 
coordination or integration with the rest of the Embassy’s country team.  This 
communications plan may provide the Embassy’s leadership with a better understanding 
of the SOCFWD’s roles and responsibilities.  At this time, the Ambassador and 
Charge’d’Affaires view SOCSOUTH’s C2 node as a subordinate element of the DoD’s 
Security Assistance element at the Embassy.79  As a result, the node’s leadership is 
excluded from many meetings and discussions pertinent to their operations.  For example, 
the node’s leadership is not invited to the daily country team brief.80  Furthermore, the 
node chief used to chair a meeting which focused on targeting.  Unfortunately, that has 
now morphed in a weekly current events meeting led by the SAO.81   
 
 
                                                 
75 U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command Fact Sheet, “352nd Special Operations Group,” The 
U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command, http://www2.afsoc.af.mil/library/factsheets/ 
factsheet.asp?id=224 (accessed September 7, 2007). 
76 U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet, “352nd Special Operations Group.” 
77 U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet, “353rd Special Operations Group.” 
78 SOCSOUTH personnel, interview by authors, Andean Ridge Sub-region, on July 30-31, 2007. 
79 SOCSOUTH personnel, interview by authors, Andean Ridge Sub-region, on July 31, 2007. 
80 SOCSOUTH personnel, interview by authors, Andean Ridge Sub-region, on July 31, 2007. 
81 SOCSOUTH personnel, interview by authors, Andean Ridge Sub-region, on July 31, 2007. 
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7. Impact to Subordinate Units 
Naturally, SOCSOUTH’s distributive C2 concept in the Andean Ridge node has 
impacted its subordinate elements.  During personal interviews with these tactical units, 
members claimed that SOCSOUTH’s forward presence has positively influenced the 
speed of command and control.82  Under the previous construct, timely response was 
often hampered by factors such as time zone differences, waiting for email replies or 
return phone calls.  With the new concept, subordinate units benefit from being 
collocated with SOCSOUTH’s C2 node.  Consequently, many of the communication 
barriers have been significantly reduced.   
Additionally, being collocated with the SOCSOUTH C2 node provides another 
intangible benefit to subordinate elements in theater.  As a result of having a 
SOCSOUTH C2 node there in country, the sub-element now has “top cover” at the 
Embassy.  The leader of the subordinate unit can now route administrative requests 
through the forward located SOCSOUTH staff.  The C2 node’s leadership can in turn 
pursue resolution through the Defense Attaché or SAO as applicable, since leadership of 
all three of those DoD elements are of equal rank. 
With SOCSOUTH championing the appropriate administrative tasks, the 
leadership of the collocated subordinate unit is free to focus almost exclusively on the 
tactical aspects of its assigned missions. 
C. CONCLUSION 
With regards to the Andean Ridge node, SOCSOUTH’s distributive C2 concept 
appears to be bearing some fruit.  While not a perfect solution, this initiative does indeed 
build a better mousetrap.  By partitioning its area of responsibility and assigning staff 
personnel to these particular regions, SOCSOUTH aims to cultivate action officers more 
in tune with regional intricacies.  Although an improved method for mitigating Andean 
crises, Distributed C2 is unlikely to produce personnel that are more than marginally 
attuned to their region’s pulse.  This, however, is largely unavoidable due to the military 
assignment process.  The vast majority of SOCSOUTH headquarters consists of active 
                                                 
82 SOCSOUTH personnel, interview by authors, Andean Ridge Sub-region, on July 30, 2007. 
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duty military personnel, who will typically be transferred to a different duty station 
anywhere from two to four years after arrival at SOCSOUTH.  Perhaps a viable option 
would be to hire a handful of government contractors to ensure continuity within the 
regional engagement branches at SOCSOUTH headquarters. 
According to personnel in the node, SOCSOUTH’s forward presence has also 
substantially improved coordination with their partner nation counterparts.  This has 
largely been accomplished through several weekly face to face meetings.83  As detailed 
above, the same is true for coordination between SOCSOUTH’s Andean Ridge node and 
its subordinate elements.  Additionally, SOCSOUTH’s intelligence personnel are fully 
integrated into the Embassy’s intelligence fusion cell, ensuring appropriate horizontal 
coordination at the intelligence analyst level.     
A word of caution is necessary here, however.  While SOCSOUTH’s tactical 
units in country and partner nations both benefit from this new arrangement that may not 
hold true throughout the sub-region.  The current levels of improved coordination and 
increased cooperation stem largely from these organizations being located in close 
proximity to the SOCFWD.  It is unlikely that other countries within the region will 
exhibit the same benefits from the presence of the C2 node.  This is because SOCSOUTH 
personnel assigned to the Andean C2 node will not be able to walk across the Embassy 
grounds or drive across town to meet with its other SOF partners within the sub-region.  
The same geographic separation remains with other countries within the sub-region 
regardless of whether SOCSOUTH personnel are back at their Miami headquarters 
location or at the Andean C2 node.  Therefore, this lack of interaction may not pay the 
same dividends as it would in the nation the node is located in.  For this reason it is 
imperative that SOCSOUTH establish its C2 presence in areas most likely to gain from 
its presence. 
An option to remedy the lack of a SOCSOUTH C2 node in every country within 
the sub-region is through the use of liaison officers (LNOs).  A single SOCSOUTH LNO 
collocated within the other U.S. Embassies within the region provides for a constant 
presence.  This arrangement would allow SOCSOUTH to keep its finger on the pulse of 
the partner nation by allowing an LNO to interact with subordinate units, the applicable 
                                                 
83 SOCSOUTH personnel, interview by authors, Andean Ridge Sub-region, on July 31, 2007. 
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Embassy country team, and also with partner nation counterparts.  The added benefit of 
this arrangement is that SOCSOUTH will already have a liaison in place should a crisis 
erupt in a country outside of regional C2 node.  This increases the potential for improved 
coordination between all stakeholders in that particular country. 
In summary, SOCSOUTH’s initial steps for establishing a C2 node in the Andean 
Ridge are promising.  Further strides will occur once the node’s manning becomes more 
robust and the U.S. Embassy’s leadership gains a better understanding of SOCSOUTH’s 
role in the Andean Ridge. 
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V. SOCSOUTH C2 NODE IN THE SOUTHERN CONE 
Islamic terrorist groups with a presence in the TBA [Tri-Border Area] 
reportedly include Egypt’s Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group) and 
Al-Jihad (Islamic Jihad), al Qaeda, Hamas, Hizballah, and al-Muqawamah 
(the Resistance; also spelled al-Moqawama), which is a pro-Iran wing of 
the Lebanon-based Hizballah.  Islamic terrorist groups have used the TBA 
for fund-raising, drug trafficking, money laundering, plotting, and other 
activities in support of their organizations.  The large Arab community in 
the TBA is highly conducive to the establishment of sleeper cells of 
Islamic terrorists, including Hizballah and al Qaeda.84 
Report from the Federal Research 
Division on Terrorist and Organized 
Crime Groups in South America 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The Southern Cone (SC) region of South America includes Brazil, Argentina, 
Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay.  SOCSOUTH’s strategy for this region as it applies to the 
war on terror is to disrupt and deter terrorist networks that may be using the Tri-Border 
Area (TBA).  The TBA, an area encompassing parts of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay, 
currently serves as a financial hub for smuggling and criminal activity.  As detailed 
during a recent visit to a U.S. Embassy in the TBA, there are millions of U.S. dollars 
generated by illegal activities that leave the region annually.  It has proven difficult to 
track where the money is going.85 
One of the biggest problems facing this particular embassy’s country team is 
corruption within the partner nation infrastructure.  The U.S. ambassador here is devoted 
to focusing his team on this issue through a layered approach of political, economic, and 
military aid.  The legal attaché and political advisor work closely with members of 
partner nation’s (PN) legislative branch in order to influence legislative action for 
                                                 
84 Rex Hudson, Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South 
America (Washington: Library of Congress, 2003), 1. 
85 Statement made by the U.S. Ambassador (country undisclosed) during a morning meeting on 
August 22, 2007. 
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deterring corruption.  Furthermore, the Embassy’s Security Assistance Office (SAO) 
actively engages the PN military to strengthen its defense posture while the U.S. Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the Regional Security Officer (RSO) work with their 
counterparts to build the PN capacity through incentives to combat corruption.  All these 
efforts aid internal security and stability for the Tri-Border Area which helps deny safe 
havens for international terrorist organizations. 
SOCSOUTH’s Southern Cone node commands and controls several lines of 
operations (LOOs) from the U.S. Embassy which support and enhance the partner nation 
special operations capacity and other interagency efforts ongoing through the country 
team.  For example, one LOO may consist of a U.S. Army Special Forces team providing 
advanced training to a partner nation’s SOF.  This would be considered a “maneuver” 
LOO.  Another LOO could be all intelligence gathering operations not directly associated 
with the maneuver LOO.  Regardless, all LOOs must be synchronized towards a common 
strategic goal for the sub-region. 
Prior to SOCSOUTH establishing its C2 element in the Southern Cone, all special 
operations in the region generally were conducted independently of each other.  They 
were synchronized to some degree within SOCSOUTH’s J3 Directorate at Homestead 
Air Reserve Base, Florida.  Within country, operations were always within the 
cognizance of the head of the SAO, a U.S. Army Colonel, but never managed by him.  
The SAOs serve as the U.S. Ambassador’s primary military advisor.  However, the 
overwhelming majority of SAO chiefs have little experience in commanding or 
controlling SOF operations.  Typically the SAO only interact with deployed SOF units in 
order to deconflict problems. 
In addition to synchronizing all SOF in-country operations, the J3 also had to 
contend with frequent additional taskings from USSOUTHCOM, further complicating 
this arrangement for the J3.  When such taskings did arise, the J3 would respond with 
whatever personnel were available.  This is what SOCSOUTH referred to as swarming a 
problem or “swarmball.” 
Previously, the J3 was broken down into functional components such as, current, 
future, and maritime operations.  Typically, the J3 staff would have some personnel 
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deployed to several U.S. embassies throughout the theater in support of ongoing 
operations.  Thus, in many cases, the J3 would not have its full complement of staff 
officers at headquarters to fulfill their daily roles.  This required “cross-pollinization” of 
personnel from different elements of the J3.  The end result was diminished situational 
awareness and continuity throughout the J3.  According to senior personnel at 
SOCSOUTH, this ad hoc method of functioning was particularly difficult to manage.  
To remedy this, SOCSOUTH placed a C2 element from its J3 staff at a U.S. 
Embassy86 in the TBA.  Additionally, SOCSOUTH rearranged its J3 in order to suit this 
regional split by creating Regional Engagement Branches (REBs) in its J3 to support its 
associated C2 node in each of the three sub-regions within the USSOUTHCOM AOR. 
B.  SOCSOUTH’S INITIAL STEPS FOR ITS SOUTHERN CONE C2 NODE 
The Southern Cone C2 node, also known as special operations command-forward 
(SOCFWD), began as a small cell of personnel commanded by a U.S. Army O-6.  The 
node’s charter was to establish coordination between special operations and the U.S. 
Embassy country team.  In this capacity the SOCFWD also provides the country team 
with a conduit to SOF and vice versa. 
With a single C2 node in the Southern Cone, SOCSOUTH’s concept is still very 
much a work in progress in terms of controlling the entire sub-region.  The future intent 
for SOCSOUTH’s distributive C2 is to command and control cross-border operations 
throughout the Southern Cone.  As SOCSOUTH’s presence matures in the TBA, the 
potential for influence will expand to other Southern Cone countries.  This will truly 
impact SOCSOUTH’s comprehensive regional strategy by placing SOCSOUTH staff 
officers throughout the sub-regions in order to maintain a finger on the pulse of their 
assigned country.  The following is a report of observations resulting from recent site 
visits and interviews at SOCSOUTH’s SOCFWD in the SC. 
 
 
                                                 
86 For operational security purposes, this thesis will not disclose exact locations of special operations 
forces nor discuss any details regarding their operations. 
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1.  Selection of Node Leadership 
SOCSOUTH’s selection of a Colonel to lead the efforts to establish its C2 
element in the TBA was based on several factors87.  First, the SAO at the embassy is a 
U.S. Army Colonel and thus SOCSOUTH’s C2 node chief would be of commensurate 
rank for conflict resolution situations.  Additionally, the presence of a Colonel as opposed 
to a Lieutenant Colonel is a political demonstration of commitment by SOCSOUTH to 
the PN military commanders. 
While valid for SOCSOUTH’s C2 node in the Andean Ridge, these reasons do 
not seem to apply for the Southern Cone.  The U.S. Embassy in the TBA is substantially 
smaller than the one observed in the Andean Ridge and subsequently has fewer 
personnel.  The internal political environment at the embassy is also very different.  The 
interpersonal relationships between members of the Department of State (DoS), DEA, 
SAO, Defense Attaché Office, and SOCSOUTH C2 element appear to be more closely 
knit.  The SC node leadership participates in the daily country team meetings and is the 
special operations voice to the ambassador.  In contrast, this arrangement does not occur 
in the Andean Ridge node because the chief of mission there wants a single point of 
contact for all U.S. Defense Department matters.  That is the ambassador’s prerogative 
but does play a role in the working relationship between the SOCSOUTH C2 element and 
the rest of the country team.  If SOCSOUTH’s node is invisible to the rest of the country 
team then, consequently, interagency personnel will not understand who SOF is, what 
SOF does, and how SOF can enhance the overall mission. 
The initial SC C2 node chief, a full Colonel, did not possess the necessary 
interpersonal skills required to interact with non-DoD personnel across the interagency.  
This factor placed constraints on SOCSOUTH’s ability to fully integrate its presence into 
concurrent interagency operations.  Forging enduring relationships is the basis for 
building trust with interagency partners at U.S. Embassies.  After six months, which is 
the normal rotation duration for the C2 element, SOCSOUTH replaced the initial SC 
node chief with a Lieutenant Colonel (O-5).  The decision to select an O-5 as the C2 chief 
                                                 
87 There may have been other factors, however, these were the two mentioned during a personal 
interview conducted with SOCSOUTH C2 node commander on August 22, 2007. 
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was appropriate because interpersonal skills were more important than military rank.  A 
leader’s ability to socially connect with a wide range of personnel from the interagency to 
non-government organizations and who has sufficient experience in special operations is 
more important than rank in the TBA.  According to the incumbent C2 element chief, 
“the right O-4 (Major or Lieutenant Commander) can do this job.”88 
2.  Interagency Education and Awareness 
The SOCSOUTH C2 element works with a variety of personnel from other 
government agencies who, in most cases, don’t fully understand SOF’s role in the greater 
mission.  It is therefore incumbent upon the all of SOCSOUTH’s nodes to educate 
interagency colleagues on the role of their C2 element and specifically how special 
operations forces can enhance their operations.  However, in order for the node chief to 
do this effectively, he must understand how the interagency operates and interacts at the 
country team level.  The C2 element’s leadership should understand the roles and 
responsibilities of the Legal Attaché, Political Advisor, Economic Advisor, Defense 
Attaché Officer, and a host of other entities that combine to support the U.S. 
Ambassador.  A SOCSOUTH C2 element with a good understanding of these roles and 
responsibilities can communicate more effectively with the host country team, thus 
facilitating a smoother transition for integration of SOF operations. 
Thus far, the only formal DoD interagency awareness training available to SOF 
personnel is a four and a half day course89 at the Joint Special Operations University 
(JSOU) in Hurlburt Field, Florida.  Unfortunately, current demand for the course appears 
low, with only three offerings in FY0890.  Excepting the JSOU course, there is no 
training mechanism for SOCSOUTH personnel to receive this type of education from the 
DoD.  Consequently, they must learn it through on-the-job training (OJT), while 
performing their normal tasks.  This places a burden on the C2 node’s ability to make a  
 
                                                 
88 SOCSOUTH personnel, interview by authors, Southern Cone Sub-region, on August 22, 2007. 
89 JSOU offers a 4.5 day course called “SOF Interagency Collaboration Course.” 
90 JSOU course offerings, https://jsoupublic.socom.mil/schedule/ 
by_course.php?req_course=SOFIACC (accessed September 20, 2007). 
 52
smooth transition during a turnover of personnel.  Furthermore, if the new commander 
isn’t proactive he may never fully understand his role in the overall mission of the 
country team. 
3.  Speed, Flexibility, Integration, and Innovation 
The current C2 element in the Southern Cone manages over three lines of 
operations which support both the partner nation military and multiple interagency 
efforts.  Prior to placing a C2 element at the embassy, these lines of operations were 
managed by the J3 at SOCSOUTH Headquarters.  However, through this arrangement, 
the J3 lacked any visibility into daily operations gained simply by residing at the U.S. 
Embassy.  Consequently, the Operations Directorate could not guide its operations as 
precisely.  By placing a SOF C2 element within the embassy, SOCSOUTH is better 
attuned to local issues that arise and can adjust its operations to improve support to 
interagency efforts.  During a recent visit to the TBA, the authors observed 
SOCSOUTH’s node chief personally interact on several occasions with member of the 
country team.  Without this communication, opportunities for proper employment of SOF 
might have been squandered.  This persistent presence in the Embassy helps develop the 
confidence necessary for successful integration into the country team. 
By having a SOF C2 element within the embassy, SOCSOUTH is more 
responsive to local issues.  Several issues that arise during the daily country team meeting 
which may affect SOF operators in the field.  For example, such an issue could be a 
security advisory issued by the ambassador which has implications for SOCSOUTH’s 
subordinate elements operating throughout the country.  Due to the distributive C2 
concept, the node is able to immediately communicate any issues, concerns, or warnings 
to subordinates in the field.  Additionally, SOF C2 elements residing at the embassies 
provide value by ensuring faster response to taskings from higher headquarters or from 
requests by interagency partners at the embassy.  This speed combined with the C2 
element’s ability to communicate with all the sub-region’s SOF components and 
headquarters element is what gives SOCSOUTH the flexibility to adapt its organization 
to suit the realities of its environment. 
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Interpersonal relationships, both informal and formal, are the hallmark of 
effective organizations.  SOCSOUTH is no exception in this regard.  In order to 
successfully execute its disruption strategy in the TBA, SOCSOUTH must leverage 
relationships and capabilities of other U.S. organizations in the country team.  During one 
recent observation, the SOF C2 node chief conducted a meeting with its PN SOF 
counterparts.  At this particular meeting, node leadership realized that some of the PN 
SOF officers were still working on the PN Army headquarters staff.  This job 
responsibility was in addition to filling their roles as the newly appointed SOF 
commanders.  These PN officers were supposed to be dedicated to their SOF unit and 
therefore not committed to any other duties.  To remedy this, the SOCFWD node chief 
worked with the SAO Colonel to leverage his relationship with the PN equivalent of the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to ensure resolution by the partner nation. 
Another positive example of maintaining SOF presence was observed during a 
visit to the embassy by USSOCOM staff personnel.  These officers had come to the 
Southern Cone in order to present the U.S. ambassador with a briefing concerning a 
particular special operations capability  The ambassador expressed a keen interest in the 
brief, as did other members of the country team.  His primary question was how he would 
be able to utilize this capability.  The Chief of Mission was reminded that his 
SOCSOUTH C2 element would be able to facilitate his special operations requirements.  
As the USSOCOM briefer continued, it became readily apparent to the rest of the country 
team that SOF had a capability that could be applied to its own operations.  With this 
epiphany, members of the interagency offered ideas about how these capabilities could 
enhance ongoing operations.  This brainstorming is a clear example of how SOF 
integration into an Embassy’s country team can inspire innovation throughout. 
Had the SOF element not been assigned to the embassy on a semi-permanent 
basis, the ambassador would have to submit SOF requirements to the SAO.  Since there 
is no institutional communication channel between the SAO and USSOCOM this process 
has the potential to take too long or garble the requirements.  A time sensitive mission 
may suffer as a result.   
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Distributed C2 in the TBA allows SOCSOUTH to achieve integration into the 
interagency process, stimulate innovation, and accomplish better synchronization and 
coordination of operations occurring in the TBA. 
C.  CONCLUSION 
A common theme echoed by many of SOCSOUTH’s leaders is that working with 
the interagency revolves around relationships.  For SOCSOUTH, the TBA is no 
exception.  This aspect of interagency partnerships should be considered as criteria when 
selecting leadership personnel for the C2 node.  The authors’ understand that it is difficult 
to screen for traits such as social adeptness and interpersonal skills, as these are not 
tangibles that can be gleaned from a questionnaire or even personal interviews.  
However, it is an important element that must not be overlooked when deciding which 
personnel to assign to these C2 nodes.  Ideally, the incumbent SOF C2 element chief 
should have the most influence in selecting his replacement since he knows the social 
environment best. 
Although not fully operational, SOCSOUTH’s Distributive C2 concept has 
already proven its worth in the TBA of the Southern Cone.  According to node personnel, 
synchronization of operations has improved and new PN capabilities are already being 
developed.  This would not be possible to the extent it is today without a SOF chief at the 
embassy coordinating action.  SOCSOUTH should continue to maintain its C2 element at 
the U.S. Embassy in the Southern Cone and should plan to expand that effort by placing 
more C2 elements at the embassies where SOF operations can expand in order to support 
the regional strategy for the TBA.  These SOCSOUTH personnel would operate as SOF 
liaison officers (LNOs) and would report directly to the C2 node for the sub-region. 
As this effort expands, the need for SOF education in interagency operations will 
remain an ongoing effort.  As a temporary solution, SOCSOUTH should coordinate with 
the Department of State or Joint Special Operations University to facilitate mobile 
training teams to SOCSOUTH with tailored curriculums that address this training 
requirement.  This training should occur on a regular basis until JSOU can accommodate 
more students. 
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Operations ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) have 
been the focal point of the GWOT thus far.  This has resulted in obvious negative 
consequences on the rotation of SOF into USSOUTHCOM’s area of responsibility 
because of the operational tempo at USCENTCOM.  Forces that were normally allocated 
to support SOCSOUTH operations are now sharing the burden in USCENTCOM’s 
region.  To assist with day to day operations, SOCSOUTH Headquarters was recently 
augmented by a 30-member U.S. Army Reserve team.  Unfortunately, these individuals 
are scheduled to be demobilized by the end of FY2007 and will subsequently return to 
their civilian jobs.  These personnel have allowed SOCSOUTH some flexibility in 
designing their C2 nodes and REBs.  Once these reservists redeploy, the REBs and C2 
nodes will have to adjust to the loss of these personnel.  This research takes into 
consideration that SOCSOUTH has limited personnel to place at other U.S. embassies for 
the current timeframe.  However, for the purpose of future manpower studies, this issue 
could justify the requirement for more mid grade level officers at SOCSOUTH’s Joint 
Operations Division (JOD). 
SOCSOUTH has taken great strides towards solving an internal organizational 
problem by rearranging the Operations Directorate into regionally oriented support staffs 
and by placing its J3 personnel closer to the operating environment.  Though, in its 
preliminary stages, the initiative in the TBA has been successful in the opinion of 
personnel assigned there.  However, in order to fully integrate the SOCSOUTH regional 
war on terrorism strategy with the distributive C2 construct, SOCSOUTH must look 
deeper into the planning phase in order to provide a long range vision and adjust 
development accordingly.  Recent observations seem to indicate that SOF LNOs would 
help realize a broader network of SOF experts embedded at the embassies across the 
region. 
Another facet of designing the long-range vision is how SOCSOUTH’s forward 
deployed C2 nodes will communicate with their LNOs within the sub-regions, as well as, 
how the nodes communicate with each other.  An institutionalized communications plan 
will be necessary for information to flow continuously between all SOF elements in the 
field.  
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Conditions for this construct have been established in one country in the Southern 
Cone thus far.  Once the opportunity for entry into a neighboring country presents itself, 
SOCSOUTH must be poised with a plan to execute the vision.  These plans would likely 
come from the J5 representative within each REB and approved by the SOCSOUTH 
Commander. 
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VI. A DISCUSSION OF COMMAND AND CONTROL AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN 
The overarching vision, endorsed by the Intelligence Community’s 
Executive Committee is to integrate the enterprise and enable cross-
organizational collaboration against critical mission areas.91 
Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In order to analyze Special Operations Command-South’s (SOCSOUTH) 
distributive command and control (C2) concept, this chapter provides a framework for 
assessing its organizational design within the confines of accepted definitions and 
organizing principles.  This chapter provides a general framework and discussion for any 
theater special operations commander to apply to his particular organization given any set 
of problems he may encounter with regards to working with the interagency and 
accomplishing SOF objectives in ambiguous environments.  
B. BACKGROUND 
As discussed in previous chapters SOCSOUTH has determined that its 
organizational design could no longer keep pace with the realities of the information age.  
It has reorganized in order to improve regional knowledge among its staff officers, push 
decision-making authority closer to subordinate units, and become more responsive to 
taskings from USSOUTHCOM.    
C. MILITARY COMMAND AND CONTROL 
One lesson that the U.S. government learned from 9/11 was that several of its 
institutional organizations and accompanying doctrines were not adequately aligned to 
                                                 
91 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, The United States Intelligence Community 100 Day 
Plan, Integration and Collaboration, Follow-up Report (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 
July 27, 2007), 1. 
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deal with the issue of transnational terrorism.  American military doctrine shapes 
conventional understanding of how U.S. forces should conceptualize terms such as 
command and control.  However, there are many ways to approach these terms and apply 
them appropriately to a given set of circumstances.  A close review of U.S. military joint 
doctrine publications will reveal that its content is written from the perspective of dealing 
with combat environments whereby maneuver operations are target-centric.  Terms such 
as “objective” are meant to explicitly define a known enemy location, stronghold, C2 
node, etc.  In contrast, in environments that do not display characteristics of open and 
direct combat an objective can become vague and difficult to define.  An example of such 
an objective is that of a “hearts and minds” campaign in a counter insurgency, where the 
target is the population of an entire village or city. 
In order to deal with these types of environments, U.S. military joint doctrine 
must redefine command and control in order to suit the full range of military operations. 
According to Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms, command and control is defined as  
The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated 
commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of 
the mission.  Command and control functions are performed through an 
arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and 
procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, 
coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment 
of the mission.  Also called C2.92 
In contrast, the United States Marine Corps (USMC) defines command as “the 
exercise of authority” and control as “the continuous flow of information about the 




                                                 
92 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 12, 2001 (as amended through 
June 13, 2007)), 108. 
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and modify command action as needed.”93  Marine Corps doctrine continues by 
describing C2 as “an interactive process involving all the parts of the system and working 
in all directions.”94  
Conducting command and control in combat environments is very different from 
performing it in non-combat environments.  One of the major differences between the 
two environments is the issue of “the objective.”  The mission objective will determine 
many aspects of the C2 structure.  The Joint Publication 1-02 definition of C2 is well 
suited for the combat environment where objectives are clear and the USMC definition is 
better suited for counterinsurgency and non-combat environments, where the objectives 
are more ambivalent. 
In standard military maneuver operations where missions such as “attack that 
position,” are clearly defined, the Joint Publication 1-02 definition of C2 is sufficient.  
However, in an ambiguous environment where SOF often operates, the mission (e.g., 
plan and execute UW) is not as clearly defined.  As a result, a special operator in the field 
must be able to operate with maximum authority, flexibility, and agility to respond to 
immediate changes emerging from dynamic situations.  The USMC definition reflects 
precisely how SOCSOUTH’s staff currently approaches C2 in its theater of operations.  
The Commanding General (CG) of SOCSOUTH has positioned senior personnel from 
his operations staff, or J3, within several U.S. Embassies in his area of responsibility.  
These individuals serve as leadership at these forward deployed C2 nodes.  A primary 
goal of these nodes is to improve synergy between special operations and the rest of the 
embassy country team by being on hand to coordinate and deconflict operations in 
country. 
In doing this, SOCSOUTH’s commander shares general strategic direction with 
his C2 node chiefs while also divesting some of his authority in order to provide the 
flexibility needed to operate in highly dynamic environments.  These node chiefs in turn 
provide continuous operational updates to the CG, who provides course corrections as 
                                                 
93 U.S. Marine Corps, MCDP 6: Command and Control Doctrine (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, October 1996), 40. 
94 USMC, MCDP 6, 40. 
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necessary.  The intermediary at SOCSOUTH headquarters between these nodes and the 
CG are the J3’s Regional Engagement Branches (REBs).  These headquarters-based 
elements consist of members from each functional staff directorate and provide staff 
support to each C2 node in its geographic sub-region. 
Within a traditional hierarchy, command authority remains at the top of the 
pyramid and is delegated to subordinates only to the degree to which they can complete 
their specific tasks.  If those tasks are repetitive, subordinates normally retain authority 
for the sake of efficiency.  However, if the task is specific and non-repetitive then 
authority is usually only delegated on a temporary basis. 
For a noncommissioned officer in charge of a squad of riflemen with orders to 
attack an enemy position, his delegated authority to direct his men as he sees fit is 
sufficient.  However, once this task is accomplished, his command authority is 
terminated.  In this type of scenario, he is left to await further orders from higher 
headquarters, where ultimate authority resides, before he can direct his men once again.  
Additionally, unlike a SOF operator in the field, a conventional squad leader is generally 
a small cog in a much bigger machine.  Consequently, an infantry squad leader does not 
require as much command authority since he will typically be working in conjunction 
with the rest of his platoon, company, battalion, etc.  Due to their tendencies to work in 
smaller groups, SOF operators the may very well be the senior U.S. military presence on 
the ground and therefore require greater command authorities.  This is a classic example 
of C2 according to the Joint Pub 1-02 definition.  However, this definition does not 
address the full spectrum of special operations in a non-combat theater where tasks are 
fluid and sometimes constrained by external political factors.  One example of this is 
special operations intelligence gathering missions, which may conflict with concurrent 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations.  While U.S. Code Title 50 governs some 
CIA authorities and Title 10 addresses DoD authorities, there remains a grey area 
between the two organizations with regards to some intelligence operations. 
In contrast to the squad leader example, the mission becomes muddled in politics 
and ambiguity for a special operator ordered to conduct intelligence-gathering operations 
in a country where the partner nation government is not favorable to U.S. presence.  In 
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this case, the operator must often navigate through carefully formed relationships in order 
to accomplish this task.  Because SOF intelligence operations may run parallel to other 
USG intelligence operations, they must be managed through Memorandums of 
Agreement (MOA) and constant coordination.  The same level of interagency 
synchronization is required for other special operations occurring in the country.  This 
requires SOCSOUTH’s C2 node chief to constantly interact with U.S. country team 
members, including the U.S. Ambassador and partner nation military leadership. 
In Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare, author Hy 
Rothstein identifies two types of command and control based on how they are structured 
to deal with uncertainty.  The first type, “detailed C2”95, tries to maximize certainty for 
those in the chain of command and tends to be centralized and formal.  Detailed C2 
“emphasizes vertical, linear information flow.”96  The other type, which originates from 
Prussian Field Marshall Helmuth Von Moltke, is “mission C2”.  “Mission C2 tends to be 
decentralized, informal, and flexible.97  Orders and plans are as brief and simple as 
possible, relying on subordinates to effect the necessary coordination and on the human 
capacity for implicit communication based on a mutual understanding of the 
requirements.”98  Mission C2 is utilized by SOCSOUTH at its C2 nodes at select U.S. 
Embassies within its area of responsibility.  The key link between Rothstein’s discussion 
and SOCSOUTH’s operations is the reliance on subordinate commanders to effect true 
coordination and communication at the country team level. 
The common denominator between mission C2, as described by Rothstein and the 
USMC definition of C2 is how information is employed to empower the field 
commander.  The Joint Publication 1-02 definition does not place emphasis here but 
rather states that “command and control functions are performed through an arrangement 
of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a 
commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in 
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98 Rothstein, Afghanistan and The Troubled Future of UW, 104-105. 
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the accomplishment of the mission.”99  The emphasis in this definition is on how 
resources are arranged rather than how resources interact.  In SOCSOUTH’s distributive 
C2 concept, transferring information and knowledge is a vital part of the design due to 
the importance of interagency communication. 
D. BREAKING DOWN THE BOUNDARIES WITHIN THE HIERARCHY 
Prior to 9/11, SOCSOUTH’s role in South and Central America was to provide 
special operations capabilities to the commander of USSOUTHCOM.  Previously, 
SOCSOUTH’s organizational structure was suited to managing the flow of SOF 
personnel into and out of the USSOUTHCOM AOR.  Presently, in the wake of 9/11, 
SOCSOUTH’s role has expanded to not only providing a SOF capability to 
USSOUTHCOM, but also to plan and execute a regional strategy for the GWOT.  This 
expanded role has placed a management burden on SOCSOUTH’s hierarchical 
organizational design. 
Thus far, SOCSOUTH has determined that its difficulty in managing operations 
throughout an entire region is largely due to its organizational design.  In addressing the 
management issues that SOCSOUTH has encountered with its recent role expansion, it is 
necessary to apply a different approach to its organizational structure. 
In business management, a great deal of research is focused on redesigning 
industrial-aged hierarchies into new organizational forms that can better keep pace with 
the realities of the information age.  One such study is in The Boundaryless 
Organization,100 which provides a basic set of principles for how any traditional 
hierarchy can enhance its structure without completely overhauling its design.  The 
book’s authors contend that traditional hierarchies typically base their success on size, 
role clarity, specialization, and control.  The authors claim that those success factors are 
no longer relevant in the information age.  They suggest that the new measures of success 
are speed, flexibility, integration, and innovation.101 
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In order to best apply these new measures of success factors in its distributive C2, 
SOCSOUTH must continue to place emphasis on the barriers inherent to its 
organizational design.  The barriers these authors identify in hierarchical organizations 
are the vertical, horizontal, external, and geographic.  As in most DoD organizations, 
SOCSOUTH faces these same boundaries, which challenge its organizational success.  
As with most military units, vertical boundaries exist between the unit commander at the 
top and the operators at the bottom of the organization.102  Next, dividing lines between 
functional staff roles such as the J4 Logistics Directorate or J5 Future Plans Directorate are 
representative of horizontal boundaries.103  External boundaries are those that exist between 
SOCSOUTH and other elements of the Defense Department, interagency partners, non-
governmental organizations, etc.  The fourth boundary is geographic and refers to 
organizations in different locations that need to work together.  In this case, it refers 
organizations with like mission such as SOCSOUTH and its Theater Special Operations 
Commands (TSOCs) counterparts.  
The authors of The Boundaryless Organization assert that these boundaries are not 
entirely harmful, but they should be made permeable enough to facilitate information flow 
throughout the organization.  In an attempt to improve its management process, SOCSOUTH 
has begun addressing several of these barriers to communication.  By combining elements 
within the J3 to form the team-based REBs, SOCSOUTH has minimized the impact of the 
horizontal boundary.  Consequently, each functional staff area is represented in the three 
REBs in order to increase awareness of the issues specific to their assigned sub-region.  
Additionally, as a result of assigning senior leadership to lead the C2 nodes at select U.S. 
embassies, SOCSOUTH has largely addressed vertical boundaries to communication, 
command, and control.  Consequently the SOCFWD C2 nodes are now directly involved 
with subordinate units operating within the sub-region.  By emphasizing interagency 
coordination through the C2 element, SOCSOUTH has begun to address the external 
boundaries, often a sticking point with USG organizations. Unfortunately the geographic 
boundary was not directly observed during this research.  Consequently, it is unknown how 
permeable the geographic barrier between SOCSOUTH and the other three TSOCs is.  
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This boundary is more relevant to tactical innovation.  As other TSOCs learn, develop, 
and implement improved operating techniques and methods, SOCSOUTH will need to 
continue collaboration in order to apply best practices to its theater. 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter covered the definition of command and control as it applies to the 
SOCSOUTH distributive C2 concept and posits that the USMC definition best suits the 
application of C2 in the USSOUTHCOM environment.  As discussed, SOCSOUTH’s 
organizational structure is based on an industrial-aged hierarchy, which operates in the 
information age.  In order for it to adapt to this new era, SOCSOUTH must measure 
success by the following factors:  speed, flexibility, integration, and innovation.  To 
accomplish this, it must continue to focus on improving communication across vertical, 
horizontal, external, and geographic boundaries.   
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND PROPOSED MODEL 
Defeating Al Qaeda will not end the plague of networked terror.  Osama 
bin Laden may long be remembered, and emulated, as an organizational 
and doctrinal pioneer who showed that network designs offer a cheap and 
effective new approach to war.  Extremist groups and rogue elements in 
governments elsewhere are sure to notice that developing their own 
commando terror networks is an attractive, cost-effective option.  Indeed, 
a new kind of arms race may ensue, in which rogue states and terrorist 
build networks for their dark purposes, while those who defend against 
and defeat them strive to cobble together their own counterterror 
networks.104 
Dr. John Arquilla and Dr. David F. 
Ronfeldt 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The leadership of Special Operations Command-South (SOCSOUTH) recently 
initiated a new concept for the command and control (C2) of its operations.  This new 
concept, called distributive C2, seeks to improve speed, increase flexibility, facilitate 
interagency integration, and achieve innovation in a military staff bureaucracy.  
SOCSOUTH hopes to accomplish this by establishing forward deployed C2 nodes in 
each of the three sub-regions within its area of responsibility.  To achieve this, 
SOCSOUTH’s Commanding General has taken the bold measure of stationing his senior 
leadership away from its Florida based headquarters and repositioning them in theater 
where SOCSOUTH’s operational assets are performing their assigned missions. 
This chapter will first analyze the SOCSOUTH distributive C2 concept by 
filtering it through the organizational design theories previously discussed.  Next, this 
chapter will make recommendations based on this analysis.  After these 
recommendations, this chapter will conclude with a proposal for what this new 
distributive C2 concept could look like after implementation of these recommendations. 
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B. ANALYSIS OF THE SOCSOUTH DISTRIBUTIVE C2 CONCEPT 
SOCSOUTH’s current operational environment demands that it remain flexible in 
order to execute its regional war on terror in the USSOUTHCOM AO.  In order to 
achieve this, SOCSOUTH has placed emphasis on its C2 design.  The C2 structure of any 
organization will influence how information is managed within it.  The SOCSOUTH 
concept for C2 is more congruent with the USMC definition than with the Joint 
Publication 1-02 definition because it places more emphasis on how resources within the 
organization interact with each other and how information is employed to empower the 
commander.  This emphasis on the power of information is echoed throughout the 
USSOCOM community in addressing how the U.S. must fight the GWOT.  
In order for SOCSOUTH to achieve information superiority, it must place 
emphasis on speed, flexibility, integration, and innovation as factors for success.105  
SOCSOUTH must look at four boundaries within its organization in order to address 
these four success factors.  These boundaries are the vertical, horizontal, external, and 
geographic.106  Thus far, SOCSOUTH’s C2 design has addressed these success factors to 
varying degree. 
The vertical boundary is the divide between the commander (i.e., the 
SOCSOUTH CG) and his ground elements working in theater (i.e., SOF operating in 
Latin America).  By placing senior personnel at the U.S. Embassies as C2 nodes, 
communications between the CG and his ground elements are more accurate and 
streamlined since the reports are funneled through a single voice. 
The horizontal boundary is the traditional divide between the various staff 
directorates, through specialization, and subordinate commands, through isolation.  By 
redesigning the J3 into regional engagement branches (REBs), horizontal boundaries 
between the various functional directorates are virtually transparent since the REBs are a  
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cross-functional team-based arrangement.  Cross talk and situational awareness between 
subordinate commands is essential to breaking the horizontal boundary of tactical units 
operating in theater. 
The external boundary is the divide between SOCSOUTH and the rest of the 
interagency that has operations and/or influence in Latin America.  This boundary has 
been partly addressed by having SOCSOUTH representative assigned to key embassies 
within the Southern Cone and the Andean Ridge sub-regions.  A priority for these nodes 
has been to effect integration and deconfliction of SOF operations into the interagency.  
In order to further degrade this boundary, these integrations efforts must be continued at 
the tactical country team level, as well as the operational and strategic levels at 
SOCSOUTH headquarters, and Washington, DC, respectively. 
The geographic boundary is the divide between SOCSOUTH and the other 
TSOCs (SOCCENT, SOCPAC, and SOCEUR).  This boundary is currently being 
addressed by implementing informal meetings via video teleconference (VTC) between 
the TSOC commanders.  In order to establish a broader global counterterrorism network, 
however, the interaction between TSOCs, and up to USSOCOM, will require more 
formalization and standardization. 
This distributive C2 concept is already addressing these four boundaries in 
varying degrees.  In this initial implementation phase, these early steps at traversing these 
boundaries are very encouraging.  As a long term concept, however, there are areas of 
this distributive C2 concept that can be further addressed to increase the effectiveness and 
efficiency of SOCSOUTH as it implements its RWOT plan. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Through the course of this research, the authors identified recommendations for 
improved performance of SOCSOUTH’s distributive C2 concept.  These suggestions are 
best placed into one of two categories.  The first category – mission essential – concerns 




C2 concept.  The second category - mission enhancing - may be considered beneficial to 
SOCSOUTH’s endeavors but their exclusion in no way degrades the chance for mission 
success. 
1. Mission Essential 
a. Strategic Communications Plan 
A multi-faceted strategic communications plan is of vital importance for 
the continued success of SOCSOUTH’s distributive C2 concept.  This plan should 
provide a systematic method for SOCSOUTH staff officers to mitigate the four 
boundaries discussed previously in this chapter. 
In part, SOCSOUTH should address horizontal boundaries by ensuring 
that formal communication links exist between its C2 nodes.  These efforts should focus 
on providing a method for sharing details of both operational successes and also 
organizational failures.  This continuous process improvement challenges each node to 
avoid pitfalls suffered by colleagues in the other sub-regions and strive for greater 
success by more expeditious, flexible, and integrated operations. 
Additionally, no formal agreement for cooperation with or integration of 
SOF currently exists at either Embassy containing a SOCSOUTH C2 node.  To minimize 
this external boundary, SOCSOUTH should establish official measures with the 
applicable Chiefs of Mission to facilitate interagency cooperation at each Embassy 
hosting a SOCSOUTH C2 node.  The Southern Cone C2 node provides an excellent 
example of how SOCSOUTH’s team can be successfully integrated into the country 
team, to the benefit of all involved.  This should represent the benchmark for 
SOCSOUTH.  Additionally reducing horizontal boundaries between the C2 nodes has the 
added benefit of improving the external boundaries through cross-node communication. 
While not directly observed, if applicable, SOCSOUTH should formalize 
a method to either maintain or establish means to share information with other Theater 
Special Operations Commands (TSOCs).  Dissolving any geographic boundaries between  
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the TSOCs stands to provide the same benefits as enjoyed by information sharing 
between the C2 nodes.  All parties stand to gain from lessons learned by their 
counterparts. 
Finally, a formal strategic communications plan between the Regional 
Engagement Branches (REBs), the C2 Nodes, and any SOF liaison officers (LNOs) at 
other U.S. Embassies (as applicable), will serve to reduce vertical and horizontal barriers 
to any previously established reporting structure.  Applied correctly, this aspect of the 
plan will encourage more coordination and communication between all sub-regional 
nodes. 
b. SOF Liaison Officers in each Embassy  
While SOCSOUTH’s forward deployed C2 nodes do improve command 
and control between its subordinate units, partner nation counterparts, and country team 
colleagues, this success is limited to the country in which the node is located.  As 
previously discussed, these improvements stem almost entirely from personal 
relationships established from daily interaction and simply by being collocated.  
Unfortunately, these interpersonal relationships rarely extend beyond the country within 
which the C2 node is located.  By assigning SOCSOUTH LNOs to U.S. Embassies 
within the sub-region, these liaisons would be the link between the C2 node and a 
particular country.  Not only will this permit SOCSOUTH to keep a finger on the pulse of 
sub-regional issues beyond the confines of the C2 node, this will also help establish 
personal relationships and educate more of the interagency on precisely what SOF can do 
for that country team.  This will prove invaluable to speed of coordination and integration 
of special operations in the event of a crisis or surge.       
2. Mission Enhancing 
a. Permanent Party Assignments for Node Leadership 
As discussed above, SOCSOUTH’s node chiefs and deputy chiefs 
currently serve on temporary rotational assignments.  This practice differs from the rest 
of the country team members who are permanently assigned to the Embassy for two or 
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more years.  Assigning SOCSOUTH’s C2 node leadership to two year tours at the 
Embassy has the potential to minimize disruption and provide command guidance 
consistency to subordinate units that often occurs due to frequent turnover of leadership 
with different management styles and agendas.  In addition, having a stable command 
presence at the C2 node facilitates integration into country team by allowing SOF leaders 
to gain and maintain the often hard won trust and interpersonal relationships with the 
country team members. 
Not all SOCSOUTH C2 node personnel need to be assigned on a 
permanent basis however.  Having two of the top three key personnel (the commander, 
the deputy, and the senior enlisted service member) on staggered two year tours would 
give the node continuity while maintaining the flexibly to interchange personalities and 
skill sets as the CG sees fit. 
b. Balance the Proper Rank with the Proper Personality 
As with any organization, possessing leadership with excellent 
interpersonal skills can make an average organization a great one.  SOCSOUTH has 
experienced just how having proactive node chiefs can benefit interagency relations at an 
Embassy.  However, SOCSOUTH should take great pains to ensure that the node chief’s 
rank is commensurate with the scope of the mission in the sub-region, as well as ensuring 
that the officer is senior enough to carry some clout both with the partner nation and the 
Embassy country team.    
c. Interagency Training for SOCSOUTH Personnel 
Currently there is no formalized training for node personnel to learn about 
the various roles and responsibilities of a myriad of members on the Embassy’s country 
team.  Within DoD channels the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) offers a 
course entitled “SOF Interagency Collaboration” however, judging by the limited 
offerings it does not appear to be in high demand.  As a long term solution the leadership 
at SOCSOUTH could institute this JSOU course as mandatory training for personnel en 
route to a permanent assignment to SOCSOUTH.  This will increase the demand for the 
course which will require JSOU to offer it more frequently than it currently does.  
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However, JSOU class offerings are funded in accordance with the prescribed military 
Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process and therefore a long term fix may not 
be feasible in the immediate future.  In order to remedy the problem in the short term 
however, SOCSOUTH could likely arrange for JSOU instructors to travel to Homestead 
ARB and provide on site training to SOCSOUTH personnel.  This is not without 
precedent, as JSOU has provided mobile training teams for other courses in the past.  
There is also the possibility of sending SOCSOUTH personnel to the Department of State 
Foreign Service Institute for interagency training. 
d. Warranted Contracting Officer Assigned to Each Node 
At the time of this writing, neither SOCSOUTH C2 node is staffed with a 
contracting officer.  Instead, contracting actions are either achieved by the Security 
Assistance Office at the Embassy, SOCSOUTH headquarters near Miami, or through a 
subordinate unit’s parent organization.  While not imperative to nodal success, assigning 
a contracting officer would be beneficial.  Having someone in the SOCFWD who is 
trained and authorized to legally obligate monies and sign binding contracts on behalf of 
SOCSOUTH would enhance operations from a logistical sense.  This enhancement 
translates directly to improvements to the speed with which SOF conducts operations in 
theater as well as increasing flexibility.  A contracting officer would be able to 
immediately satisfy unpredictable spur of the moment operational requirements for 
subordinate units in the field rather that slowing down the process in order to wait for 
another entity to respond.     
D. PROPOSED DISTRIBUTIVE C2 MODEL 
This thesis proposes that the integration of the two mission essential 
recommendations discussed above into the SOCSOUTH Distributive C2 Concept will 
create a model of theater SOF C2 that will improve SOCSOUTH’s (or any TSOC’s) 
effectiveness and efficiency in executing its RWOT as well as its participation into a 
larger GWOT.  There are two keys to this model.  First, SOCSOUTH must create greater 
SOF presence throughout its AOR by having personnel embedded within critical national 
level agencies and within every country team.  Second, SOCSOUTH should establish a 
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theater wide communications plan that ensures cross-talk and coordination across the 
vertical, horizontal, external, and geographic boundaries at all levels of command. 
Looking at this model (see Figure 13), the SOCSOUTH distributive C2 structure 
can be broken into three layers.  The first layer comprises the SOCSOUTH headquarters 
and national level within the continental United States.  The second layer resides at the 
forward C2 node and sub-region level within the Andean Ridge, the Southern Cone, and 
the Caribbean and Central America.  The final layer is at the SOF LNO and individual 
country team level within each U.S. Embassy throughout Latin America. 
At the first level, SOCSOUTH improves its presence by exchanging LNOs with 
the interagency, the GCC, and other SOF commands.  SOCSOUTH transcends the 
vertical boundaries through its creating of its four forward C2 nodes.  Horizontal 
boundaries are crossed by SOCSOUTH fully integrating its intelligence and logistics 
directorates into each of the J3’s REBs.  External boundaries are permeated through the 
aforementioned LNO exchange, and the geographic boundary is degraded through formal 
lines of communication with other TSOCs and USSOCOM. 
SOCSOUTH improves is presence within each sub-region by establishing these 
permanent forward C2 nodes within each sub-region at the second level.  This also 
greatly enhances SOCSOUTH’s ability to transcend external boundaries by creating a 
formal mechanism for interagency integration within each sub-region.  Horizontal 
boundaries are crossed through a formal communications plan that has each sub-region 
C2 node cross-talking and coordinating operations with each other as the terror enemy’s 




Figure 13.   Thesis Proposed Distributive C2 Model 
 
At level three, SOCSOUTH finds its presence most enhanced through the 
establishment of LNOs within each U.S. embassy in its AOR.  These same liaisons will 
facilitate the crossing of external boundaries by establishing relationships with their 
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respective country teams and other organizations operating in that specific country.  As 
with the forward sub-regional C2 nodes, these LNOs will cross talk to track and 
deconflict operations as the influence and operations of the terror threat moves between 
individual countries. 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter first took SOCSOUTH’s distributive C2 concept and analyzed it 
through various organizational design lenses.  This analysis illustrated that SOCSOUTH 
and this concept faced four boundaries that needed to be transcended in order to be 
effective:  the vertical, the horizontal, the external, and the geographic. 
After this analysis, this thesis made several recommendations for increasing the 
success of SOCSOUTH’s distributive C2 concept.  These recommendations are best 
categorized as either mission essential (work smarter) or mission enhancing (work 
easier).  There were two mission essential recommendations: (1) create a strategic 
communication plan; and (2) place SOF liaison officers in all U.S. Embassies within 
SOCSOUTH’s area of responsibility.  There were four mission enhancing 
recommendations: (1) permanently assigning key node leadership to staggered two year 
tours; (2) balancing the proper rank of the forward C2 node leader with the proper 
personality to interact with the interagency effectively; (3) establishing formal 
interagency training for SOCSOUTH personnel; and (4) assigning a warranted 
contracting officer to each node. 
This chapter concluded by proposing its own model of distributive C2 that 
integrated the mission essential recommendations with the SOCSOUTH concept.  With 
LNOs and a strategic communications plan in place, this model of distributive C2 
achieves two goals: it creates greater SOF presence throughout the AOR and within 
critical national level agencies and it establishes a theater wide communications plan that 
ensures cross-talk and coordination across all levels of command. 
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VIII.  CONCLUSION 
The War on Terror will be a long war.  Yet we have mobilized to win 
other long wars, and we can and will win this one.  During the Cold War 
we created an array of domestic and international institutions and enduring 
partnerships to defeat the threat of communism.  Today, we require similar 
transformational structures to carry forward the fight against terror and to 
help ensure our ultimate success.107 
National Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism, September, 2006 
The purpose of this thesis was to conduct a thorough analysis of the SOCSOUTH 
Distributive C2 concept and propose recommendations for improvement of its 
effectiveness and efficiency.  This was accomplished by first conducting a thorough 
threat assessment of the SOCSOUTH AOR, followed by a detailed description of the 
SOCSOUTH Distributive C2 Concept.  The authors then conducted site visits and 
personal interviews at the Andean Ridge and Southern Cone forward C2 nodes.  This 
description and site visit observations were analyzed through several theories of 
organizational design to develop two sets of recommendations – mission essential and 
mission enhancing.  These recommendations were then integrated into the SOCSOUTH 
concept to derive a proposed model for distributive C2. 
What was discovered was that SOCSOUTH’s original concept for distributive C2 
was valid not only for the C2 within its own AOR but for other TSOCs as well.  By 
implementing the mission essential recommendations – in essence using the proposed 
model in this thesis – SOCSOUTH will have a C2 structure that allows it to effectively 
combat terrorism in the information age.  This concept of distributive C2 allows 
SOCSOUTH to execute its operations quicker (speed), adapt more efficiently 
(flexibility), coordinate its operations with the interagency more effectively (integration), 
and ensures that cross-talk and the sharing of ideas occurs (innovation). 
 
                                                 
107 The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 19. 
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A. OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTATION 
Despite the merits of this concept of distributive C2, SOCSOUTH will face 
significant obstacles in getting this concept fully resourced and implemented.  Within the 
DoD, SOCSOUTH will face challenges to breaking the institutional norms well 
established in the hierarchy of the DoD.  Outside of the DoD, SOCSOUTH will have to 
battle the politics and self interests of the various government agencies whose support is 
required for this concept to work. 
1. Obstacles Inside the Department of Defense 
In regards to the obstacles within the DoD, Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, 
in their book Essence of Decision, propose their Organizational Behavior Model (OBM).  
The OBM views actions as “outputs of large organizations functioning according to 
standard patterns of behavior.”108 
The process of decision-making in the OBM (i.e., selecting what action to do) is 
centered on the enactment, or reenactment, of existing routines.  Existing routines are 
characterized by organizational objectives, sequential action toward these objectives, 
standard operating procedures (SOPs), programs and repertoires, uncertainty avoidance, 
problem-directed search, and organizational learning and change.  Drastic change only 
occurs when there is a budgetary feast, a prolonged budgetary famine, or dramatic 
performance failure.  The dominant factors influencing decisions in the OBM can be 
broken down into the short-term and the long-term.  In the short-term, a course of action 
(COA) is selected based on how closely it resembles existing outputs.  In the long-term, a 
COA is selected based on how closely it matches the organization’s views on its tasks, 
capabilities, programs, and routines.109 
Under the OBM, SOCSOUTH will have to break the “this is how we’ve always 
done it” mentality in order to acquire the resources and support it needs to fully 
                                                 
108 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis 
(New York, NY: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishing, 1999), 143. 
109 Allison and Graham, Essence of Decision, 391. 
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implement this concept.  Existing organizational norms, SOP, and programs will have to 
be altered or discontinued in order to fully implement this concept. 
2. Obstacles Outside the Department of Defense 
While the obstacles within the DoD seem significant, the obstacles SOCSOUTH 
will face gaining the support of other government departments and agencies will be 
significantly greater.  SOCSOUTH will have to contend with the inherent politics of 
Washington, DC.  These politics manifest themselves in the inherent interests of key 
players and key departments carrying more weight than the greater good of the Nation. 
In her book Flawed by Design, Amy Zegart explains her theory on how national 
security agencies (for the purposes of this thesis, SOCSOUTH can be seen as a national 
security agency) are created and evolve through her National Security Agency Model.  
This model has at its base the premise that “national security organizations are not 
rationally designed to serve the national interest”110 since their formation and future 
evolution is so heavily influenced by the actions of separate government players acting in 
their own self interests.  To counter the individual interests of government players, Zegart 
proposes in her model that a national security agency will only evolve if the Executive 
Branch drives change.111  While existing bureaucratic actors will still fight to preserve 
their own institutional interests since they have much to gain or lose with the alterations 
to the status quo, it is the power and will of the Executive that will see that national 
interests are best served. 
For SOCSOUTH, this means that the support and political backing of the 
Secretary of Defense and the President are essential in gaining the resources and support 
from outside the DoD required to fully implement this concept.  The support of the 
Executive will be needed to dictate changes in the DoS, DoJ, DNI, and other government 
departments. 
 
                                                 
110 Amy B. Zegart, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NCS (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1999), 8. 
111 Zegart, Flawed by Design, 39. 
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B. IMPLICATIONS FOR USSOCOM AND OTHER TSOCS 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, this thesis has both validated this 
distributive concept for SOCSOUTH and also validated it as a C2 construct for other 
TSOCs as they execute their own RWOTs.  As each TSOC reorganizes and redesigns 
their C2 structure to better network its organization and push assets forward into their 
respective theaters, USSOCOM will, by the actions of these TSOCs, have the basis for its 
own global counterterrorism network.  
To fully take advantage of these regional wars on terror C2 networks, however, 
more drastic changes to the existing relationships between the TSOCs, their respective 
GCCs, and USSOCOM are required.  Each TSOC is best postured to plan, resource, and 
fight a regional WOT as part of a broader global WOT.  Under the existing 
TSOC/GCC/SOCOM relationship, however, each TSOC belongs to a GCC with only 
coordination lines existing between the TSOC and USSOCOM.  In order to expand this 
regional distributive C2 concept into a global distributive C2 network, this relationship 
would have to be reversed.  Each TSOC would have to then fall under the operational 
control of USSOCOM with only coordination lines existing with each GCC. 
The expansion of the SOCSOUTH distributive C2 concept to other TSOCs and 
USSOCOM has broader implications for the force providers that man each TSOC and 
USSOCOM.  Besides reorganizing each TSOC into a war-fighting command (more 
dollars, equipment, and manpower), the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines that 
operate within them will need additional training and education, regardless of their 
branch of service or assigned military occupational specialty.  Language and cultural 
awareness training will be a must for all personnel assigned to forward C2 nodes.  
Leaders will have to have a greater understanding of the task, responsibilities, and 
purposes of other government departments they interact with.  These other government 
departs will need education on what these forward C2 nodes are there to do, and, perhaps 




C. FINAL REMARKS 
Since transnational terrorist organizations are not stopped by national, regional, or 
continental borders, a TSOC must be prepared to conduct operations across a wide range 
of political and social environments.  SOCSOUTH understands this and has begun to 
implement its new distributive C2 concept.  This thesis was started as an attempt to 
validate this concept and propose any recommendations for future improvements.  What 
has emerged during this thesis process is that with two essential modifications this 
distributive C2 concept cannot only improve SOCSOUTH’s ability to execute its RWOT, 
but can aid all the other TSOCs in their counterterrorism effort.  Additionally, by further 
integrating these TSOCs under one command (USSOCOM), a global counterterrorism 
network is, in effect, created. 
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